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Chapter I 
Introduction to the Research Problem 
1.1 . Background to the Study 
The role of traditional justice as an option for dealing with the legacy of the 
past in African countries under transition, has gained increasing recognition 
over the recent years. Rwanda, through its use of the traditional gacaca 
courts alongside the Western modelled courts, has been a moving example 
of an attempt to attain comprehensive justice in dealing with the legacy of the 
genocide.1 In Uganda, the proposed juxtaposition of the traditional mato oput 
ceremony alongside international justice is bringing hope to the country, as it 
seeks to end more than two decades of armed conflict.2  Likewise, in 
Mozambique, the local communities have on their own initiative resorted to 
the traditional magamba ritual ceremony in seeking justice for the atrocities 
committed during the war, despite the government’s official policy of not 
facing the legacy of the war.3   
 
The situations in Rwanda, Uganda and Mozambique, which represent similar 
trends across the continent, have elicited very interesting questions in the 
transitional justice discourse. The first question is whether this is an 
                                                            
1 Ambos (2009:187). The post genocide period in Rwanda came to be characterised by a 
true proliferation of justice mechanisms with divergent aims, designed to ensure 
accountability for the genocide. Four transitional justice regimes were therefore designed. 
These were the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR), the Rwandan National 
Courts, National Unity and Reconciliation Commission (NURC) and the local gacaca courts. 
2 The armed conflict has seen government forces fighting forces of the Lord’s Resistance 
Army (LRA). The government of Uganda has recognised the legitimacy of the International 
Criminal Court by referring its situation to the Court. On the other hand, there is also a wave 
of opinion preferring resort to traditional justice to ensure realisation of peace and justice in 
Uganda. 
3 Igreja and Dias-Lambranca (2008:61). 
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indication that traditional justice in Africa is increasingly being regarded as 
equally legitimate to, if not more acceptable than the now universally 
recognised transitional justice mechanisms, such as prosecutions, truth 
commissions, amnesties and reparations. The other and more important 
question is whether traditional justice, even if it enjoys legitimacy, can 
effectively deal with serious crimes under international law, which usually 
characterise societies under transitions.  
 
The aim of this paper is to critically provide answers to the above questions, 
the main emphasis being the second question.  The paper analyses whether 
traditional justice enjoys public legitimacy to justify its application or 
continued application in transitional societies. Further, given that many 
countries under transitions have a legacy of serious international law crimes, 
the paper critically analyses whether traditional justice is able to deal 
adequately with serious crimes under international law, an area which has 
otherwise been traditionally reserved for the formal national or international 
courts.  
 
In answering the above questions, this paper will focus chiefly on the 
operations of the gacaca Courts of Rwanda, the mato oput justice 
proceedings as implemented under the customary law of Uganda and the 
magamba ritual ceremonies of Mozambique. The paper will also make 
constant references to a cross-section of other African traditional justice 
practices, in so far as they relate to crimes analogous to those found under 
Western law.  The focus of this paper is restricted to the African context, and 
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the use of the word “traditional justice” refers to “African traditional justice 
practices.” Further, the terms “customary law and traditional law” and 
“customary courts and traditional courts” will be used interchangeably 
throughout this paper.  
 
1.2. Research Question 
The experiences in Rwanda, Uganda and Mozambique have brought 
traditional justice and international criminal law at cross-roads. While using 
traditional justice to deal with the atrocities of the past, transitional countries 
cannot avoid dealing with serious crimes under international law, which 
usually characterise the bad legacy of the past.   
 
Under the present international criminal law jurisprudence, States have a 
primary obligation to try and punish perpetrators of serious crimes committed 
by predecessor dictatorial regimes or during periods of internal conflicts.  
This obligation is evident in the creation of the International Criminal Court 
(hereinafter “the Court” or “the ICC”).4 It is also found in the jurisprudence 
which prohibits amnesty for serious international crimes.5 Further, the 
recognition of the principle of universal jurisdiction, under which any State 
                                                            
4 Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (“The Rome Statute”) adopted on 10 
November 1998 and entered into force on 1 July 2002. The main aim for the creation of the 
International Criminal Court was to do away with impunity by ensuring trial and punishment 
of persons bearing the greatest responsibility for the most serious crimes of concern to the 
international community as a whole. See preambles 4 and 5, and articles 1 and 5 of the 
Rome Statute. The creation of the ICC guarantees the primacy of States in respect of 
serious crimes under international law because the ICC assumes jurisdiction of a matter only 
if a State is unable or unwilling to try its suspects. See preambles 6 and 10, and articles 1, 
17 and 20.  
5 See for example Almonacid –Arellano et al v. Chile [2006] IACHR-12.05 and Prosecutor v.  
Morris Kallon and Brima Bazzy Kamara [2004] SCSL-2004-15-AR 72 (E) and SCSL-2004-
16-AR 72 (E). 
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can try a perpetrator of serious international crimes, also bears testimony to 
this fact. Finally, the obligations of States in respect of serious international 
crimes is also found in various treaties, including human rights treaties, 
which require States to undertake effective investigations in respect of those 
crimes. 
 
A State can only enjoy this primacy if it incorporates serious international 
crimes under its national laws.6 Most African States have dual legal systems 
comprising of the Western-modelled formal courts and traditional courts. The 
latter dispense traditional justice. This means that once a State incorporates 
serious international crimes in its national legal system, it may opt to use 
traditional justice in respect of those crimes. However, by its very nature 
traditional justice does not fall squarely with international criminal justice, as 
it mostly deviates from it in key areas of procedure.  
 
This puzzle is what this paper seeks to deal with. Thus, the main question 
this paper seeks to answer, which is whether traditional justice has the 
capacity to handle serious crimes under international law, has been 
divided into the following parts, namely: 
 Whether traditional justice meets the minimum standards of 
accountability for perpetrators, considering the fact that it usually 
emphasises peaceful resolution, reconciliation and reintegration, with 
retribution only playing an insignificant role;  
                                                            
6 Young (2005:122). 
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 Whether traditional justice prescribes adequate reparations for victims 
while ensuring that the perpetrator atones for the crime committed;  
 Whether traditional justice has guarantees for due process for 
offenders and whether it provides safeguards for victims;  
 Whether recourse to traditional justice would comply with a State’s 
international obligation of bringing perpetrators of serious crimes to 
justice; and, 
  Whether recourse to traditional justice procedures in dealing with 
serious international crimes would not evidence unwillingness or 
inability of a State to genuinely investigate or prosecute in respect of 
article 17 of the Rome Statute.  
 
In brief, this paper will attempt to arrive at an acceptable middle ground 
between calls for the application of traditional justice mechanisms to 
international crimes on the one hand, and on the other, the demands of 
international criminal justice. 
 
1.3. Significance of the Study 
This study is timely as it seeks to respond to the controversial question being 
increasingly raised in contemporary legal literature, namely, whether 
traditional justice has any role to play in international criminal justice.  
Throughout the transitional justice genealogy, traditional justice has been 
sidelined in favour of the Western-modelled transitional justice mechanisms. 
The coming into force of the Rome Statute of the ICC (hereinafter “the Rome 
Statute”) has reinforced this situation by insisting that those bearing the 
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greatest responsibility for the most serious crimes be prosecuted at all cost. 
However, it should be noted that despite being part of the global community, 
African communities have their traditions which have slightly different notions 
of justice to the ones perceived by the international community. These 
notions are embedded in African traditions which enjoy legitimacy among the 
local communities. Prosecution of perpetrators of serious crimes will be 
meaningless if the process does not enjoy legitimacy of the victims, as the 
same plays a key role in transitions.   
 
This study is significant as it seeks to generate wide debate on this very 
issue, not merely for academic reasons, but with the aim of implementation 
in practice. The study thus has a practical significance. 
 
1.4. Literature Review 
It cannot be disputed that since the advent of the contemporary transitional 
justice discourse, the whole transitional justice genealogy has been 
dominated by Western classic transitional justice arrangements.7 Teitel 
divides the transitional genealogy into three phases, all of which confirm this 
trend.8 Mohammed Bedjaoui, a former president of the International Court of 
Justice also confirms this trend by referring to transitional justice 
                                                            
7 Teitel (2000:39). The modern transitional justice discourse can be traced to the Treaty of 
Versailles of 28 June 1919 in which the victorious powers made attempts to make German 
Emperor, Wilhelm II, account for the atrocities of the World War I. 
8The first phase is the post World War II period which is symbolised by the Nuremberg trials. 
The phase was characterised by criminal sanctions and the need for accountability for War 
Crimes. During this period, transitional justice was an interstate cooperation. The second 
phase is the post cold war period. Here transitional justice was contextual, limited and 
provisional. It was characterised by multiple conceptions of justice (amnesties, adhoc 
tribunals and truth commissions). The last phase is at the beginning of the 21st century, 
characterised by the ICC, a permanent Court established to try war crimes, genocide, 
aggression and crimes against humanity. See: Teitel (2003:69-94). 
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arrangements which are mostly employed in transitional societies as being 
influenced by “the dominant euro-centric origins of international law.”9  
 
However, McEvoy and McGregor have noted that these Western influenced 
transitional arrangements, though having international and national support, 
have relatively failed to attract legitimacy amongst the local population 
because of their remoteness to the people they are supposed to serve.10 
Ambos has argued that legitimacy is key to transitions, which means that any 
preferred transitional justice arrangement needs to enjoy legitimacy of the 
people it is supposed to serve.11  
 
Given the fact that we are living in a global community, writers have 
emphasised that if at all traditional justice is to be followed to deal with past 
atrocities, it still has to meet minimum international standards for it to be 
recognised as a satisfactory. Villa-Vicencio for example, is of the view that 
there is a need to find a meeting place between international justice and 
traditional justice.  He also opines that nations committed to sustainable 
justice and reconciliation after deep conflict, cannot afford either to demonise 
or romanticise international justice or traditional mechanisms of justice and 
reconciliation.12 He calls for an inclusive sense of justice which meets the 
demands of both the international community and the people of the country 
concerned.13  
 
                                                            
9  Smith and Fitzpatrick (1999:148). 
10 McEvoy and McGregor (2008:11). 
11 Ambos (2009:176). 
12 Villa-Vicencio (2009:130). 
13Villa-Vicencio (2009:179). 
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Although traditional justice issues have been robustly debated in recent 
years, scant attention has been devoted as to whether traditional justice has 
the capacity to handle serious international crimes to a point that it can 
substitute international tribunals.  This is the main difference between the 
focus of this paper and the points generally focused upon, in most of the 
literature on the subject of transitional justice.  
 
1.5. Methodology 
This study is based on desk research. In the main, the principal reference 
materials are court decisions, international legal instruments, national laws, 
reports, law text books, commentaries and law journal articles.   
 
1.6. Limitations of the Study 
The paper has a limited scope. All it does is to study the extent to which 
traditional African customary law procedures, such as the gacaca, mato oput, 
magamba and others, lend themselves to dealing with serious international 
crimes in a way in which legitimacy and accountability are not compromised. 
 
1.7. Overview of the Chapters 
The first chapter, being this one, serves to introduce the topic, its scope and 
the general significance of the study.   
 
Chapter two lays down the conceptual framework of this paper. It defines 
“traditional justice” and “serious crimes under international law.” It discusses 
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the law relating to the international obligations of States in respect of serious 
crimes under international law. The chapter also sets out a theoretical basis 
for arguing that traditional justice structures have the capacity to handle 
serious crimes under international law.  
 
The third chapter studies African customary institutions and their 
characteristics. The chapter highlights common features of justice available 
in African traditions, notably the gacaca, mato oput and magamba.  The 
chapter compares these to the principal aspects of international criminal 
justice, pointing out similarities and areas of divergence and exploring the 
potential area where both traditions could find each other.   
 
Chapter four puts into perspective the discussion of chapter three. It looks at 
the possible ways of adapting traditional justice, so as to successfully 
accomplish its use in handling serious crimes under international law.  
 
Finally, chapter five concludes this study with a set of recommendations. 
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Chapter Ii 
Obligations of States for Serious Crimes Under   International Law 
2.1. Introduction 
Use of traditional justice by States in dealing with serious crimes under 
international law can only be lawful if it is not inconsistent with the obligations 
of States in respect of serious crimes under international law.14 States have a 
primary duty to prevent, investigate and punish serious international crimes. 
This duty has existed under both treaty and customary international law for a 
long time.15   In the present times, it is at the centre of the international 
criminal law discourse. It is highlighted in at least four areas of the 
international criminal law dialogue. These are: treaties, including regional 
human rights treaties; the prohibition of amnesties for serious international 
crimes; the universality principle; and the principles under the Rome 
Statute.16  
 
This chapter sets out the theoretical basis for arguing that traditional justice 
has sufficient structures capable of handling serious international crimes.  
Besides, it analyses the above four referred to areas which outline the 
obligations of States for serious international crimes. The predominant theme 
of the chapter will be that since its inception, international criminal law has 
and continues to accord national jurisdictions priority in dealing with serious 
international crimes. 
                                                            
14 For instance, use of traditional justice to shield a perpetrator of serious international 
crimes will be inconsistent with obligations of the State under international law. See article 
17 of the Rome Statute. 
15 Holmes (1999:74). 
16 Preambles 4 and 10, and articles 17 and 20 of the Rome Statute. 
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The paper makes consistent reference to the terms “traditional justice” and 
“serious crimes under international law”. It is therefore necessary to briefly 
explain these concepts, before undertaking the above-mentioned discussion. 
 
2.2. What is Traditional Justice? 
The term “traditional justice” is imprecise. However, the word “traditional” 
refers to norms or patterns that are embedded in political, economic and 
social structures of a particular society.17 Therefore, traditional justice refers 
to conceptions and practices of justice entrenched in a cultural setting of a 
particular society. It identifies a particular society in relation to justice as 
perceived by that society. Thus, resort to African traditional justice should not 
be seen as being primitive, but rather as a way to identify the values useful in 
the preservation of the African sense of justice.18  
 
Traditional justice is based on traditional or customary law and forms part of 
the legal system of many countries, especially in Africa.19 It co-exists side by 
side with the Western legal system. In some countries like Botswana it has 
nevertheless been fully integrated into the Western legal system.20 
Otherwise, traditional justice is applied and enforced in customary or 
traditional courts presided over by lay persons or chiefs.21 In many countries 
                                                            
17 Huyse and Salter (2008:7).  
18  Latigo (2008:85). 
19 Preamble, Traditional Justice Bill of South Africa, No. 15 of 2008. 
20 Fombad (2004:173). 
21 The Constitution of the Republic of Malawi, 1994, Section 110 (3). 
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jurisdiction of customary courts is not only restricted to customary law, but 
also usually covers minor common law as well as statutory offences.22 
 
Customary law manifests itself in ‘informal or living’ customary law and 
‘formal’ customary law. Informal or living customary law owes its origins to 
the actual customary usages as currently ‘lived’ and practised by the 
community. It is enforced in informal customary courts, which are usually 
restricted to informal proceedings and usually not governed by rigid modes of 
procedure.23  
 
By contrast, formal customary law is the official customary law recognised by 
States and is part of the institutions of State. Its procedure is usually enacted 
in Statutes. It is enforced through formal customary courts. For instance, in 
Botswana, the Minister of Local Government may establish such courts and 
assign their jurisdiction.24 In Malawi, in 1969, the regime of President 
Kamuzu Banda established formal traditional courts in an attempt to make 
the administration of justice ‘more palatable to the Government and the 
people.’25In current times, the gacaca courts in Rwanda have acquired 
formal attributes and are part of the State institution and transitional justice 
policy.26 
Presently, courts apply traditional or customary law differently to how it was 
applied during the colonial period. During that time, and especially in British 
                                                            
22 The Constitution of the Republic of Malawi, 1994, Section 110 (3). 
23 Fombad (2004:176). 
24 Section 7 (2), Customary Law Act of Botswana, 1969, (Chapter 04:05). 
25 Brietzke (1974:37). The Traditional Courts were established by virtue of the Local Courts 
(Amendment) Act No. 31 of 1969. 
26 Huyse and Salter (2008:8). 
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colonies, courts applied customary law subject to the “repugnancy clause.” 
This means that customary law was valid as long as it was not contrary to 
public policy, morality, humanity and natural justice.27 These terms were 
defined from the British point of view. The repugnancy clause thus became a 
weapon used to prohibit the applicability of rules of customary law that were 
perceived primitive, uncivilised or contrary to British morality.28  In this way, 
the colonial masters successfully managed to abrogate many parts of 
customary law and procedure. Thus, most restrictions to the applicable 
scope of customary law today can be traced to the colonial influence.29 
 
In addition, during this period of colonialism, the existence or content of the 
rules of customary law was a question of fact that had to be proven by 
evidence using textbooks, reported cases or expert opinions. As such, 
customary law ended up being treated as foreign rather than ordinary law.30 
 
However, the perception of customary law during the current times has 
changed rapidly. At present, customary law is no longer subject to the 
repugnancy test as conceived by the British.  It is rather subject to the rules 
of natural justice and Constitutional provisions, especially the bill of rights.31 
Thus, customary law like any other law can only be invalid when it is 
                                                            
27 Section 2, Customary Law Act of Botswana, 1969, (Chapter 04:05). 
28 Fombad (2004:171). 
29 Fombad (2004:171). For instance, section 10 (8) of the Constitution of Botswana, 1966, 
provided that “no person shall be convicted of a criminal offence unless it is defined and the 
penalty is described by law.” By implication, the application of customary law to criminal 
offences was watered down and made subject to statutory law, there by excluding 
customary law which is usually oral tradition and not written down.  
30 Fombad (2004:182). 
31 Himonga and Bosch (2000:315). Under the preamble of the Traditional Bill of South Africa, 
(Bill No. 15 of 2008 ), traditional justice will be applicable as long as it conforms to 
constitutional imperatives and values, including the right to human dignity, the achievement 
of equality and the advancement of human rights and freedoms. 
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inconsistent with the Constitution, and only to the extent of such 
inconsistency.32 Consequently, when developing customary law, courts 
should not hasten to strike down customary rules which appear incompatible 
with their respective Constitutions, but must rather adapt them so as to bring 
them into accord with the spirit of the Constitution.33 
 
 Another development in the present application of traditional law has been 
the change of methods used to ascertain rules of customary law. Currently, 
the existence or content of the rules of customary law is no longer a question 
of fact, but rather a question of law for the court to decide. This means that 
judges are now allowed to take judicial notice of the existence or content of 
the rules of customary law.34 
 
From the above discussion, the main crucial observation made by this paper 
is that in most jurisdictions, apart from handling customary law matters, 
customary law also handles minor statutory and common law offences. 
Consequently, this paper contends that since statutory and common law are 
modelled on the Western legal system, traditional law can therefore also 
handle international crimes. This is so because international criminal law is 
also based on the Western legal system and also largely regulated by 
Statutes. The paper further argues that the restriction placed on traditional 
law to apply only to minor statutory and common law offences, is not as a 
result of the lack of traditional justice structures to deal with major offences. It 
is rather the result of incapacity in terms of procedure and personnel to 
                                                            
32 The Constitution of the Republic of Malawi, 1994, section 5. 
33 Himonga and Bosch (2000:317). 
34 Schiller (1960:178). 
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handle such major offences.35 This is the theoretical basis for arguing for the 
applicability of traditional justice to serious crimes under international law.  
 
 The above, is supported by the fact that the features of traditional justice 
show that it is flexible to handle serious international crimes. For instance, as 
observed, traditional justice is now applied subject to the bill of rights under 
the Constitutions of various States. Thus, judicial guarantees to fair trial can 
be ensured. Further, traditional justice is dynamic and constantly adapting to 
changing social and legal conditions.36 This can be shown from the 
transformation in its applicability during colonialism and now. This shows that 
traditional justice can meet developing challenges37 whether under national 
or international criminal law. Given the fact that transitional processes have 
to be credible and legitimate, traditional justice could therefore be justifiably 
adapted to deal with serious crimes under international law. 
 
 
 
 
2.3. What are Serious Crimes under International Law? 
                                                            
35 This argument finds support in the fact that in Malawi, traditional courts had jurisdiction 
over serious statutory crimes such as murder, manslaughter and treason. Having to resort to 
minor offences under the Malawian Constitution was because of the incapacity of lay chiefs 
who were unable to apply the law on these serious cases properly. See Brieztke (1974: 37-
56). 
36 Himonga and Bosch (2000:319). 
37 Fombad (2004:168). 
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There are many crimes under international law.38 However, not all crimes are 
considered serious crimes under international law. According to the Rome 
Statute, the concept of serious crimes refers to “the most serious crimes of 
concern to the international community as whole.”39 These crimes are within 
the jurisdiction of the ICC. They are the crime of genocide; crimes against 
humanity; war crimes; and the crime of aggression.40  
 
Regarding the crime of aggression, until the Kampala Review Conference of 
the Rome Statute,41 the Court remained unable to exercise jurisdiction over 
the crime as the Statute did not define the crime or set out jurisdictional 
conditions.42 The Review Conference however has adopted by consensus 
amendments to the Rome Statute which include a definition of the crime of 
aggression and a regime establishing how the Court will exercise its 
jurisdiction over this crime.43  The conditions for entry into force decided 
upon in Kampala however provide that the Court will not be able to exercise 
its jurisdiction over the crime until after 1 January 2017 when a decision is to 
be made by States Parties to activate the jurisdiction.44  
Thus, a discussion on the crime of aggression is beyond the scope of this 
paper. Therefore, reference to serious crimes under international law is in 
                                                            
38 Piracy is probably the oldest known international law crime. Another crime is torture. 
However nowadays, torture is usually connected to crimes against humanity when 
committed as part of a systematic and wide-spread attack on civilian populations. 
39 Article 5 (1). 
40 Article 5 (1).  
41 The Review Conference was held in Kampala, Uganda between 31 May and 11 June 
2010. 
42 Article 5 (2).. 
43 Article 8 bis of the Rome Statute adopted in Kampala defines the crime of aggression as 
the planning, preparation, initiation or execution by a person in a leadership position of an 
act of aggression. The definition also contains a threshold requirement that the act of 
aggression must constitute an apparent violation of the United Nations Charter. 
44 Coalition for the International Criminal Court (2010). 
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this paper restricted to the crime of genocide, crimes against humanity and 
war crimes.  
 
The main common features of the above-mentioned crimes are that they are 
committed as part of an official policy,45 in the context of organised 
violence,46 and they affect the interests of the world community as a whole.47  
The official policy may be encouraged either by the State or rebel groups in a 
country. This encouragement makes it possible for the crimes to be 
committed not only by State agents, but also by civilians.48 Besides, the 
context of organised violence in which these crimes are committed makes it 
easy for the official policy to manifest itself. As noted, serious crimes under 
international law must be punished at all cost. It is the primary duty of States 
to ensure this. The entire discussion that follows is dedicated to this aspect 
 
 
2.4. Presumption in Favour of National Jurisdictions in Investigating 
and Prosecuting Serious Crimes 
                                                            
45 See Sriram (2009:325). For instance, for crimes against humanity, article 7 (2) (a) of the 
Rome Statute requires commission of the offence pursuant to or in furtherance of a State or 
organisational policy. Likewise, under article 8 (1) of the Rome Statute, the Court shall have 
jurisdiction over war crimes “in particular when committed as part of a plan or policy...”  
46 Werle (2009:141). For instance, for genocide the context is the destruction of one of the 
protected groups. For crimes against humanity the context is widespread or systematic 
attack on a civilian population, while for war crimes the context is the existence of an armed 
conflict. It is this connection to the context which gives these crimes their international 
element. 
47 According to preamble 3 of the Rome Statute, the protected interests are peace, security 
and well-being of the world. The same is true for the aims of the United Nations Charter. See 
Article 1 of the Charter of the United Nations, signed on 26 June 1945. See also Werle 
(2009:31). 
48 The Rwandan genocide was encouraged by State leaders who encouraged hatred against 
Tutsis and moderate Hutus. This ‘official’ encouragement played a big role for civilians to kill 
each other. 
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National jurisdictions play a very big role with regard to serious international 
crimes. Since its advent, international criminal law has contained a 
presumption in favour of national investigation and prosecution of core 
crimes.49 For instance, at the end of the First World War, the Allied powers 
deferred their rights to bring German war criminals before the military 
tribunals, in favour of the German national jurisdiction.50 Germany was 
allowed to exercise jurisdiction over war crimes, and was in turn forced to 
pass new legislation to enable it prosecute war crimes under its national 
laws.51  
 
The Allies however reserved the right to set aside the German verdicts in 
case of unsatisfactory results.52 This meant for instance that the Allies could 
assume jurisdiction over the cases already tried by Germany, if for example 
they were meant for purposes of shielding the accused persons from 
responsibility. This development showed the trust accorded to national 
jurisdictions in dealing with serious crimes and also reflected the 
complementarity principle under which an international court like the ICC can 
only assume jurisdiction of a matter if a State is unable or unwilling to 
investigate or prosecute suspects of serious crimes.53   
 
                                                            
49 Kleffner (2008:1). 
50 El Zeidy (2008: 15). After the First World War, the Allied powers and Germany signed the 
Treaty of Versailles. According to articles 228-230 of this treaty, German was obliged to turn 
over suspected war criminals to the Allies for trial in the Allied Military Tribunals. See the 
Treaty of Versailles of 28 June 1919. 
51 El Zeidy (2008:16). 
52 El Zeidy (2008:15). 
53 El Zeidy (2008:16) argues that the fact that the Allies subsequently agreed to defer to the 
German courts rather than to enforce their rights to prosecute the alleged war criminals, 
denotes a shift from the notion of primacy to the more restrained notion of complementarity.  
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Since the Treaty of Versailles,54presumption in favour of national jurisdictions 
has continued to be manifested in conventional international law and 
customary international law, which have detailed how core crimes should be 
enacted into national laws.55 For instance, in cases of war crimes, the four 
Geneva Conventions56 impose a duty on High Contracting States to “enact 
any legislation necessary to provide effective and penal sanctions for 
persons committing or ordering to be committed any of the grave breaches 
[of the Convention].”57 Likewise, the Genocide Convention58 imposes a duty 
on High Contracting Parties to enact the necessary legislation to provide 
effective penalties for persons guilty of genocide or any of the other acts 
enumerated in the Convention.59   In the case of crimes against humanity, 
customary international law governed the regime of national jurisdiction for 
the said crimes, prior to the coming into force of the Rome Statute.60  
 
                                                            
54 Of 28 June 1919. 
55 Kleffner (2008:1). 
56 The Four Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949. 
57 See Geneva Convention I (articles 49), Geneva Convention II (articles 50), Geneva 
Convention III (articles 129) and Geneva Convention IV (articles 146) 
58 Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide. Adopted by 
Resolution 260 (III) of the UN General Assembly on 9 December 1948, and entered into 
force on 12 January 1951. Now the prohibition of genocide has evolved into a norm of 
customary international law and is recognised to have a jus cogens status. See: Prosecutor 
v. Kayishema and Ruzindana [1999] ICTR-95-1-T, paragraph 88. 
59See Article 5 of the Genocide Convention. In addition, article 6 of the Genocide Convention 
provides a mandatory obligation to try persons charged with genocide in a competent 
tribunal of any State in the territory of which the act was committed or in such international 
penal tribunal as may have jurisdiction acceptable by States Parties. Kleffner (2008:17) has 
rightly argued that since such tribunal remained dormant before the coming into force of the 
ICC, the suppressive regime of the Genocide Convention was thus confined to national 
territorial criminal jurisdictions.  
60According to Kleffner (2008:18), codifications were limited to the Statutes of the 
Nuremberg and Tokyo Tribunals and Control Council Law No. 10. Later, though the statutes 
of the International Criminal Tribunals for Yugoslavia and Rwanda (“ICTY” and “ICTR” 
respectively) were highly significant in the customary process of defining crimes against 
humanity, they nevertheless did not contain any rules on national suppression in respect of 
this crime.  
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In addition, treaties which contain crimes that would amount to crimes 
against humanity,61 such as the Apartheid Convention62 have also required 
national States  to enact laws to prosecute an punish persons responsible for 
apartheid.63At present, the Rome Statute imposes a clear duty on States to 
investigate or prosecute serious crimes. It is only when a State is unwilling or 
unable to investigate or prosecute, that another State party to the Rome 
Statute or the ICC itself can assume jurisdiction over the matter.64 
 
It therefore follows that since its inception, international law has never been 
interested in usurping the role of States in the handling of international 
crimes, including serious crimes.  The presumption in favour of national 
jurisdictions will continue as long as States, acting in line with their 
obligations to prosecute serious international crimes, amend their national 
laws so as to meet the demands of investigating and prosecuting serious 
international crimes. This duty of States to prosecute serious crimes is 
highlighted in the following discussion that discusses four key areas where it 
is outlined.  
  
2.5. Obligations of States for Serious Crimes under Treaty Law 
Treaty law is one area where the duty of States for serious international 
crimes can be derived. As pointed out above, treaties such as the Geneva 
Conventions, the Genocide Convention and the Apartheid Convention have 
                                                            
61 When committed as part of a widespread and systematic attack on a civilian population. 
62 International Convention on the Suppression and Punishment of the Crime of Apartheid, 
adopted on 30 November 1973 and entered into force on 18 July 1976. 
63  Article IV states that State parties must adopt legislative, judicial and administrative 
measures to prosecute and punish in accordance with their jurisdiction persons responsible 
for apartheid. 
64 Article 17 of the Rome Statute. 
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persistently demanded national provisions for effective penal sanctions 
against those responsible for serious crimes.65  
 
More significantly, human rights treaties66 have emphasised the duty of 
States to respect and secure rights and freedoms of their citizens. The 
European Court of Human Rights (hereinafter “ECHR”) and the Inter-
American Court of Human Rights (hereinafter “IACHR”) have in turn held that 
the obligation to respect rights and freedoms requires that there should be 
effective official investigations in case of serious violation of human rights.67 
Such investigations should be capable of leading to the identification and 
punishment of those responsible.68 This jurisprudence is now firmly 
established such that the Human Rights Committee has openly stated that 
States have a duty to thoroughly investigate, prosecute, try and punish those 
persons responsible for such human rights violations.69  
 
                                                            
65 The same applies under the Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman 
Treatment or Punishment. Adopted on 10 December 1984, and entered into force on 26 
June 1987. 
66 These treaties include the European Convention on Human Rights, adopted on 4 
November 1950 and entered into force on 3 September 1953, American Convention on 
Human Rights, adopted on 22 November 1969 and entered into force on 18 July 1978, 
African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights, adopted on 27 June 1981 and entered into 
force on 21 October 1986, and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, 
adopted on 16 December 1966 and entered into force on 23 March 1976. 
67 Articles 1 of the European Convention on Human Rights and American Convention on 
Human Rights are similar in that they impose on States a general obligation to protect and 
secure rights and freedoms of their citizens. On this aspect, for the ECHR, see Assenov v. 
Bulgaria [1998] ECHR-90/1997/874/1086, paragraph 102.  As for the IACHR, see Velasquez 
Rodriguez v Honduras [1988] IACHR-4/1988, paragraphs 173 and 178.   
68 Assenov v. Bulgaria [1998] ECHR-90/1997/874/1086.  See also Tanis and Others v. 
Turkey, [2005] ECHR-65899/01 paragraph 203. 
69 Nydia Bautista de Arellana and Arbuacos v. Colombia [1995] Human Rights Committee, 
paragraph 8.6. Views under article 5 (4) of the optional protocol of the International 
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. 
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The duty of States to investigate and prosecute serious crimes can take 
several forms. In Velasquez Rodriguez v. Honduras70 the IACHR held as 
follows: 
‘This duty to prevent includes all those means of a legal, political,  
administrative and cultural nature that promote the protection of  
human rights and ensure that any violations are considered and 
treated as illegal acts, which, as such, may lead to the punishment 
of those responsible and the  obligation to indemnify the victims for 
damages. It is not possible to make a detailed list of all such 
measures, since they vary with the law and the conditions of each 
State Party.’ 
 
Thus, the duty of States in respect of investigating and prosecuting serious 
crimes depends on the conditions in each State. It is not only legal conditions 
that are vital in determining a State’s ability to fulfil this duty. Cultural 
conditions should also be considered. In addition, “while the State is 
obligated to prevent human rights abuses, the existence of a particular 
violation does not, in itself, prove the failure to take preventive measures.”71 
Further, “the duty to investigate, like the duty to prevent, is not breached 
merely because the investigation does not produce a satisfactory result.”72 
 
All this buttresses the point that the duty of States to investigate and 
prosecute serious crimes presupposes good faith on the part of the States. 
Further, this duty, apart from requiring States to enact legislation to deal with 
serious crimes, also presupposes resort to cultural values of the States 
where necessary. Thus, it is submitted that the obligation of States for 
                                                            
70 Velasquez Rodriguez v. Honduras [1988] IACHR-4/1988, at paragraph 175. 
71 Velasquez Rodriguez v. Honduras [1988] IACHR-4/1988, paragraph 175.  
72 Velasquez Rodriguez v. Honduras [1988] IACHR-4/1988, paragraph 177. 
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serious crimes has to do with the whole of a particular State’s legal and 
cultural system. In the context of our discussion, culture should include 
indigenous and traditional forms of administering justice in accordance with 
the culture of a given national society. 
 
2.6. Obligations of States for Serious Crimes under Customary 
International Law  
 Customary international law is a norm of international character recognised 
and accepted by civilised nations and is independent of any express treaty or 
other public Act.73 It has two elements which are State practice and opinio  
juris. State practice means that the norm must be general, and universally 
and consistently followed by States.  Opinio  juris on the other hand means 
that States should abide by the norm out of a sense of legal obligation.74  In 
Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, the court stated that the requirement that a customary 
rule should command the general assent of civilised nations in order to 
become binding upon them all, is a stringent one.75  
 
Thus, certain crimes have assumed customary law status and have been 
recognised to be norms of jus cogens. These crimes are deemed to violate 
universally accepted norms of human rights, and States are obliged to 
investigate and prosecute them as a matter of obligation. War crimes,76 
                                                            
73 See The Paquete Habana [1900] 175 US 677 at 708. 
74 Filartiga v. Pena- Irala [1980] 630 F. 2d 876.  
75 Filartiga v. Pena-Irala  [1980] 630 F. 2d 876, at paragraph 881. 
76 For instance in 1946, the United Nations General Assembly urged all States including non 
member States of the United Nations to arrest persons responsible for war crimes during the 
Second World War and return them for prosecutions in the States where the crimes were 
committed.  
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crimes against humanity,77 genocide78 and torture,79 all of which are serious 
international crimes, have assumed customary law status. Further, the Rome 
Statute is a central indicator that the obligation to prosecute serious 
violations of international law is supported by customary law.80 
 
2.7. No Amnesty for Serious Crimes under International Criminal Law 
The duty of States to investigate and prosecute serious international crimes 
is also contained in the jurisprudence that prohibits the granting of amnesties 
for such crimes. In Barrios Altos v. Peru it was held that “all amnesty 
provisions, provisions on prescription and the establishment of measures 
designed to eliminate responsibility are inadmissible, because they are 
intended to prevent the investigation and punishment of those responsible for 
serious human rights violations...”81 Likewise, according to Almonacid-
Arellano et al v. Chile, crimes against humanity cannot be susceptible of 
amnesty. “States cannot neglect their duty to investigate, identify and punish 
those persons responsible for crimes against humanity by enforcing amnesty 
laws or any other similar domestic provisions.”82 
 
                                                            
77 According to Bassioun (2010) crimes against humanity have been part of customary 
international law for a long time. He states that the term “crimes against humanity” originates 
from the 1907 Hague Convention Preamble which codified the customary law of armed 
conflict. However in the present time crimes against humanity need no connection to armed 
conflicts. 
78 The prohibition of genocide has evolved into a norm of customary international law and is 
recognised to have jus cogens status. See Prosecutor v. Kayishema and Ruzindana [1999] 
ICTR-95-1-T, at Paragraph 88. 
79 According to Filartiga v Pena-Irala [1980] 630 F. 2d 876, torture has gained a customary 
law status. 
80 The ICC codifies war crimes, crimes against humanity and genocide, all of which are 
customary law crimes. 
81[2001] IACHR-88/2001, at paragraph 41. 
82[2006] IACHR-12.05, at paragraph 114. 
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The discussion on amnesty is relevant to this paper because typically, 
traditional forms of administering justice are inclined towards achieving 
reconciliation and forgiveness of crimes, with little emphasis on retribution. 
The overriding idea is to restore social peace and harmony. However, it is a 
cardinal principle of international criminal law as seen so far, that, “forgive 
and forget provisions can not be permitted to cover up the most severe 
human rights violations.”83 Thus, traditional justice would only be consistent 
with obligations of States for serious crimes if its values do not have the 
same effect as that of amnesties for serious crimes.  
 
2.8. Universal Jurisdiction 
The concept of universal jurisdiction is another sign that serious international 
crimes must not be left unpunished. It thus confirms the obligations of States 
to punish persons responsible for committing serious crimes under 
international law. Kwakwa84 rightly connects the principle of universal 
jurisdiction to the ‘seriousness of an offence’ by stating that the principle 
refers to the “exercise of criminal jurisdiction solely on the basis of the nature 
of the crime.”85 The principle of universal jurisdiction allows every country to 
exercise criminal jurisdiction over crimes under international law regardless 
of any link to the crime.86  
 
                                                            
83 See concurring opinion of Judge Sergio Garcia Ramirez in Barrios Altos v Peru [2001] 
IACHR-88/2001, at paragraph 11. 
84 Kwakwa (2002:407). 
85 Kwakwa (2002:407). 
86 Werle (2009:64). 
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The validity of the principle of universal jurisdiction under customary 
international law is generally acknowledged for genocide, war crimes in 
international and civil armed conflicts and in crimes against humanity.87  All 
these are recognised as serious crimes under international law. In practice, 
Belgium resorted to the principle of universal jurisdiction by prosecuting two 
Roman Catholic nuns for complicity in the 1994 Rwandan genocide.88  
 
The principle of universal jurisdiction therefore manifests the seriousness 
that States attach to serious international law crimes. Thus, resort to 
traditional justice for these crimes will only be meaningful if it also mirrors the 
same seriousness and is not merely a sham. 
 
 
 
2.9. Obligations of States for Serious Crimes and the Rome Statute of 
the ICC 
The Rome Statute makes clear two things: First, serious crimes under 
international law must not be left unpunished. Second, it is States 
themselves which have a primary duty to investigate, try and punish these 
crimes.89 Thus, the Rome Statute presumes the obligation to try and punish 
                                                            
87 Werle (2009:67). 
88 The nuns, Getrude Mukangango and Maria Kisito Mukabutera were convicted in 2001 and 
given long prison sentences of 15 and 12 years respectively. See ‘Nuns Jailed for Genocide 
Role,’ BBC News (2001). 
89 Under preamble 4 of the Rome Statute, States Parties affirm that the most serious crimes 
of concern to the international community must not go unpunished. States also affirm that 
they must take measures to ensure effective prosecution of serious crimes at national level, 
while at the same time not sidelining international cooperation in their prosecution. 
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serious international crimes in favour of national jurisdictions.90 
Consequently, the ICC is a sort of standby court in case of failure by States 
to fulfil this obligation.  The ICC is thus complementary to national criminal 
jurisdictions.91 This complementarity is outlined in greater detail in articles 17 
and 20 of the Rome Statute. Under these articles, the complementarity 
principle does not only fulfil a procedural step of determining admissibility of 
cases before the ICC.  It has also wider implications concerning the 
conceptualisation of the role of national criminal jurisdictions in the system of 
international criminal justice.92 
 
Under article 17 of the Rome Statute, there are four instances where the 
ICC, acting in favour of national jurisdictions can refuse to assume 
jurisdiction of a crime. The first instance is where a case is being investigated 
or prosecuted by a State having jurisdiction over it, unless that State is 
unwilling or unable to genuinely investigate or prosecute.93 Second, it is 
where the crime has been investigated by a State having jurisdiction over it 
and that State has decided not to prosecute. However, such decision must 
not have arisen from the State’s unwillingness or inability to genuinely 
prosecute.94  Third, the ICC will refuse to admit a case when the suspect has 
already been tried by the national courts and trial by the ICC is not permitted 
                                                            
90 It is the duty of every State to exercise its criminal jurisdiction over those responsible for 
international crimes. See Preamble 6 of the Rome Statute. 
91 See Preamble 10 of the Rome Statute. 
92 Kleffner (2008:19). 
93 Article 17 (1) (a). 
94 Article 17 (1) (b). 
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under the ne bis in idem rule.95 Finally, the ICC will refuse jurisdiction where 
a case is not of sufficient gravity to justify its further action.96 
 
A State will be deemed unable to investigate or prosecute a case in three 
instances: when the proceedings were or are undertaken for purposes of 
shielding the offender from criminal prosecution; when there is an 
unjustifiable delay in the proceedings; and where there is no independence 
or impartiality in the conduct of the proceedings. The unjustifiable delay or 
lack of independence or impartiality must be one which is inconsistent with 
intent to bring the offender to justice. Most importantly, all these three 
instances must be determined having regard to the principles of due process 
recognised by international law.97  Inability refers to the State’s incapability to 
investigate or prosecute owing to a total or substantial collapse or 
unavailability of a State’s national judicial system.98 
 
As noted above, apart from being a procedural article, article 17 manifests 
the complementarity between the ICC and national jurisdictions. It outlines 
the role of national criminal justice systems in the scheme of international 
criminal justice. The basic idea of article 17 is therefore threefold. First, is to 
enhance national jurisdiction over serious international crimes; second, is to 
perfect national legal systems to meet the demands in respect of those 
crimes; and third, is to maintain State sovereignty for serious international 
                                                            
95 Article 17 (1) (c). This is where article 17 is connected with article 20. 
96 Article 17 (1) (d). 
97 Article 17 (2). 
98 Article 17 (3). 
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crimes.99 Thus, complementarity implies a duty on the State to adjust both its 
substantive and procedural law so as to meet the demands of investigating 
or prosecuting international crimes.100  
 
Since the ICC respects judicial sovereignty of a State which is able and 
willing to fulfil its obligations for serious international crimes, it should also be 
able to respect the judicial sovereignty of a State which genuinely opts to 
resort to traditional justice in dealing with serious international crimes as long 
as the demands for the same are met.  
 
Just as Velasquez Rodriguez v. Honduras does,101 the Rome Statute implies 
that the duty of States to prosecute serious international crimes presupposes 
good faith. Holmes102 argues that reference to “genuineness” in article 17 of 
the Statute resembles the concept of good faith. Good faith will be exhibited 
if a State uses all lawful means at its disposal to carry out its obligations 
under the Statute in such a manner that perpetrators of serious international 
crimes are identified and punished.  
 
The concept of good faith is related to the willingness as well as ability of a 
State to investigate or prosecute serious international crimes. For instance, a 
State will manifest a deceitful intent contrary to its apparent actions where it 
unreasonably delays the proceedings or where it prosecutes but passes a 
                                                            
99 Young (2005:122).See also Prosecutor v. Germain Katanga and Mathieu Ngudjoro Chui 
[2009] ICC-01/04-01/07 OA 8, paragraphs 59 and 83, where the Court stated that the 
principle of complementarity was designed to protect the sovereign right of States to 
exercise their jurisdiction in good faith when they wish to do so. 
100 Young (2005:126). 
101[1988] IACHR-4/1988, at paragraphs 175 and 177. 
102 Holmes (2002:674). 
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lighter sentence or pardons the sentence. This would easily qualify as 
‘shielding the offender.’103 Likewise, good faith will not be exhibited where, 
with intent to shield offenders from justice, the executive and legislative arms 
of government put pressure on the judicial system, thus compromising its 
independence and impartiality.104 The concept of good faith equally applies 
when determining inability. For instance, a State would while acting in good 
faith, nonetheless be unable to investigate or prosecute where its national 
legal system or central government has collapsed due to conflict, crisis or 
public disorder.105   
 
2.10. Conclusion 
This chapter has laid down the conceptual framework of this paper. It has 
found that in practice, traditional justice is used in most African countries to 
try common law or statutory law offences as well. The chapter has set the 
framework for justifying the use of traditional justice in respect of serious 
crimes under international law.  
 
Further, the chapter has outlined the primary obligations of States in respect 
of serious international crimes. The obligations require States to review their 
national laws so as to incorporate serious international crimes into their 
                                                            
103 Arbour and Bergsmo (1999:131). 
104 The ECHR has determined that independence means independence of the executive, the 
parties or even independence of the parliament. See Ringeisen v. Austria [1971] ECHR-
2614/65, at paragraph 95 and Campbell and Fell v. The United Kingdom [1984] ECHR-
7819/77, at paragraph 78. 
105 Paper on Some Policy Issues before the Office of the Public Prosecutor (2003:4). A good 
example is Somalia where there is no central government. Rwanda was also incapacitated 
to investigate and prosecute genocide immediately after its aftermath because of the 
collapse of the national and legal system. Colombia is also an example reflecting the State’s 
incapacity to put on trial drug dealers. 
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judicial systems, and thus be able to resort to traditional justice where 
necessary. Since these obligations also require States to take into account 
their cultural conditions, resort to traditional justice in dealing with serious 
international crimes would not per se be inconsistent with a particular State’s 
obligations in respect of serious international crimes.  
 
The next chapter analyses characteristics of traditional justice. It highlights 
common features of justice available in African traditions and compares them 
to the principal aspects of international criminal justice. It points out 
similarities and areas of divergence between the two justice systems and 
explores the potential area where both traditions could find each other. 
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Chapter Iii 
Traditional Justice and Obligations of States in Respect of Serious 
International Crimes  
3.1. Introduction 
The use of traditional justice in enforcing the primary duty of States in 
respect of serious international crimes entails the adaptation of the rules of 
traditional justice in order to meet the challenges of investigating and 
prosecuting these crimes.  This chapter analyses the features of traditional 
justice. It departs from the point that, just as in international criminal law 
jurisprudence, traditional justice also requires that serious crimes under 
tradition must not be left unpunished. In support of this argument, the chapter 
discusses three traditional customary law institutions, namely the gacaca 
courts of Rwanda, the mato oput ceremony of Uganda and the magamba 
spiritual ritual of Mozambique. 
 
 The chapter also evaluates the core aspects which are common to 
traditional justice mechanisms to see whether they measure up to the need 
to hold perpetrators of serious crimes accountable for their conduct.  Finally 
the chapter will make out a case whether traditional justice should be 
encouraged as a resort for serious international crimes or should be 
completely ignored.  
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3.2. Traditional Justice and Duty in Respect of Serious Crimes: A 
Look at the Three African Traditional Customary Law Institutions 
The gacaca, mato oput and magamba spirits are well known institutions in 
the African traditional justice discourse. While gacaca has already been 
tested in dealing with offences relating to genocide in Rwanda, the mato oput 
is being earmarked for dealing with offences relating to war crimes in 
Uganda. The magamba spiritual ceremony on the other hand has been 
restricted to communal use as the present post-conflict Mozambican 
government has not gone the transitional way, nor has there been any 
meaningful debate at national level about the need to implement transitional 
justice mechanisms. 
 
3.2.1. The Gacaca Courts  
On 24 July 2009, the Rwandan government announced that it would stop 
taking new gacaca cases as of 31 July 2009 and that it intended to wind 
down gacaca operations within five months from then.106 Since that 
proclamation, there have been two failed attempts to wind up the gacaca 
proceedings, and as of April 2010, the gacaca courts were still in progress.107 
Despite the uncertainty as to the winding up of the proceedings, the 
discussion on the gacaca institution continues to dominate the transitional 
justice dialogue.108  
 
                                                            
106 Gordon (2009). 
107 ‘Gacaca Courts Closure Postponed Again’ (2010). 
108 Longman (2006:207). 
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To begin with, the word ‘gacaca’ means ‘justice on the grass.’ It is derived 
from the word ‘umugaca,’ the Kinyarwanda word referring to a plant that is so 
soft to sit on that people preferred to gather on it.109 Originally, the primary 
aim of these people’s gathering on the grass was to restore order and social 
harmony after a dispute and to a lesser extent, to establish the truth about 
what had led up to the dispute. It was also to determine the punishment of 
the offenders. Normally, such punishment could involve the payment of 
compensation or the giving of a gift to the complainant.  Although the latter 
elements could be part of the resolution, they were subsidiary to the return to 
harmony between the lineages and a restoration or purification of the social 
order.110     
 
When the first genocide trials began in 1996, the sheer numbers of accused 
persons overwhelmed the capacity of the Rwandan judicial system. Facing 
this quandary and the pressure to fight impunity, while at the same time 
contributing to the process of reconciliation, the Rwandan government turned 
to the gacaca justice process in 2005 to alleviate the genocide caseload that 
was threatening to collapse the country’s criminal justice machinery.111 There 
are five objectives of the gacaca courts, which are: truth telling; reconciliation 
and reintegration; eradicating a culture of impunity; speeding up trial; and 
                                                            
109 Ingelaere, (2008:33. 
110 Ingelaere (2008:34). 
111 Longman (2006:207).  According to Oomen (2009:192), the gacaca courts have both 
pragmatic and ideological background, and were resorted to after the government of 
Rwanda failed to cope with a backlog of 120,000 prisoners which were in Rwandan prisons 
by 1999. 
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demonstrating Rwanda’s ability to solve own problems.112 As of 2007, there 
were 12,000 existing gacaca courts in Rwanda.113 
 
The gacaca courts have been designed to deal with crimes ranging from 
genocide to crimes against property. They consist of three levels; the gacaca 
courts of the cell (responsible for property crimes), the gacaca courts of the 
sector (responsible for serious attacks without intention of causing death), 
and the gacaca courts at district level (responsible for serious attacks 
causing death or made with intention of causing death). Category one crimes 
which include organising genocide, participation in rape and sexual attacks 
or particular overzealousness in causing deaths continue to be tried in 
regular courts.114 However, it is still the gacaca courts at the cell which 
function as courts of first instance in all genocide cases and which classify 
the crimes.115  
 
The gacaca courts are presided over by a minimum of 9 village judges, the 
inyangamugayo. They are formally elected in government-organised 
elections, and include women and all adults from the age of 21 years rather 
than simply the most senior men of the community. The inyangamugayo are 
required to be individuals who are morally upright, honesty, trustworthy and 
characterised by a spirit of sharing speech.116 They receive limited training in 
                                                            
112 Scanlon and Nompumelelo (2009:302). See also Preamble to the Organic Law No. 
40/2000, of 26 January 2001, setting up “Gacaca Jurisdiction.” 
113 Scanlon and Nompumelelo (2009:302). 
114 Article 51, Organic Law No. 40/2000. See also Articles 39 to 42. 
115Articles 33 and 34, Organic Law No.  40/2000. 
116 Article 10, Organic Law No. 40/2000. 
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law and legal procedure.117Generally, they enjoy some credibility in their 
respective communities. This is because the current crop of the 
inyangamugayo is selected solely on the basis of integrity and not according 
to the old traditional prescriptions of “old and wise men” many of whom had 
to be replaced because they still had the old mentality of ethnic 
intolerance.118 
 
Hearings of the gacaca courts are conducted at least once a week, and are 
held in public except for those held in camera for reasons of public 
order.119Community participation in the gacaca process is encouraged. 
However, reticence to participate caused government to make community 
participation in the proceedings mandatory as of 2004.120Failure to 
participate without convincing reasons attracts various sanctions, including 
being turned away from public medical clinics.121 The Amnesty International 
has heavily, and rightly so, criticised this form of sanction.122 Nevertheless, in 
the general terms, gacaca courts enjoy legitimacy of the community by virtue 
of their location, making it possible for free community participation in the 
proceedings.123 
 
                                                            
117 Ingelaere (2008:49). 
118Ingelaere (2008:48). 
119 Articles 24 and 25, Organic Law No. 40/2000. 
120 Oomen (2009:194). 
121 Scanlon and Nompumelelo (2009:308). 
122 Scanlon and Nompumelelo (2009:308). 
123 For instance, according to the extensive community intervention with the assistance from 
John Hopkins University, 96% of Rwandans had heard of the gacaca courts by 2003, and as 
of 2002, public confidence in gacaca courts was high, standing at 82%. See Oomen 
(2009:194). 
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Gacaca courts have on the other hand been criticised for lack of competence 
and independence of the judges. The judges lack adequate legal training to 
justify the gravity of the offences dealt with. Further, their independence is at 
risk because they are not paid for their services. This leaves many of them 
prone to corruption, as the majority are just poor farmers.124  
 
The other major criticism of the gacaca courts is that they provide no legal 
representation for defendants. The basis for the same is that doing so would 
distort a popular form of justice. This is unfair to the accused persons 
considering the fact that they are subjected to professionally gathered 
evidence, yet they do not have the benefit of a professionally trained defence 
counsel.125  
 
Third, the gacaca institution has been criticised for poor witness protection 
policy. Since 2000, there have been 160 reprisal killings of genocide 
survivors, judges and witnesses connected to the gacaca. The witness 
protection programme established in 2006 in response to this, has been 
hampered by lack of funds and political will.126 
                                                            
124 Longman (2006:214-15). 
125According to Article 47 of Organic Law No. 40/2000, State investigators have been 
gathering evidence of those involved in the genocide since 1994 and they supply whatever 
evidence gathered to the judges for the trial phase of the gacaca courts. Besides, whenever 
need be, gacaca courts are provided with assistance of judicial advisors appointed by the 
‘Gacaca Jurisdictions’ Department of the Supreme Court. See Article 29 of Organic Law No. 
40/2000. 
126 Scanlon and Nompumelelo (2009:308). 
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Finally, the fact that gacaca courts have not tried crimes perpetrated by the 
Rwandan Patriotic Front has been criticised as a form of victor’s justice 
against the Hutus and has affected the legitimacy of the courts.127  
 
All these criticisms are justified considering the fact that gacaca courts have 
jurisdiction to impose long prison sentences of as high as 25 years and life 
imprisonment.128 Thus, long time incarceration of convicted persons is only 
justified after a fair and impartial court process. 
 
Despite the above weaknesses, the gacaca institution has a sound juridical 
basis. It should therefore not be condemned simply because it differs from 
classical Western courts.129 Both the old and new gacaca institutions are 
premised on the theory that serious crimes under tradition must not be left 
unpunished.  It has been noted that in its ‘old’ form, the primary aim of the 
gacaca was the restoration of order and social harmony, punishment of the 
perpetrator and compensation. Order and social harmony could not be 
achieved if the gacaca institution entertained a culture of impunity for serious 
crimes under tradition. In their new form, gacaca courts are so serious about 
eradicating a culture of impunity such that among other things, they are 
empowered to prosecute and punish any person who refuses to testify on 
what he knows about the genocide.130 Thus the new gacaca institution aims 
                                                            
127 Longman (2006:221) notes that in Byumba, a region where there were extensive 
massacres by the Rwandan Patriotic Front troops, many people expressed anger over the 
fact that the deaths of their family members were not included in the gacaca process. Thus, 
as a form of protest, the gacaca assemblies in this area were usually short of the required 
quorum. 
128 See chapter 4 (sanctions), Organic Law No. 40/2000. 
129 Longman (2006:213). 
130 Article 32, Organic Law No 40/2000. 
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at eradicating once and for all the culture of impunity that has persisted in 
Rwanda.131 
 
3.2.2. The Mato Oput Ceremony 
Following the successful experiences of the gacaca system, Uganda is 
planning setting up a transitional justice framework, which will include a 
traditional justice mechanism of mato oput, to address the atrocities 
committed during the last 20 years in the north of the country. Indeed resort 
to traditional justice such as the mato oput has been recognised by both the 
government and the LRA. Ruhakana Rugunda, Ugandan Minister of Internal 
Affairs and leader of the Government negotiating team at the Juba peace 
talks, defended the mato oput as an alternative to the ICC trials by stating 
that “the traditional methods are both symbolic and real. They have worked. 
Instead of rushing for Western solutions, it is good we have revived them.”132 
He added that the system would be upgraded to meet international 
standards.133 
 
The negotiating teams at the Juba peace talks agreed in principle that the 
application of this traditional rite, among others, is one of the appropriate 
mechanisms to address the issues of accountability and reconciliation.134 An 
analysis of the operations of the mato oput will help this paper determine 
                                                            
131Preamble, Organic Law No. 40/2000. 
132 Latigo (2008:100). 
133 Latigo (2008:100). 
134 Latigo (2008:103. 
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whether the vision of the juba talks can be realised in the same way as the 
gacaca process.  
 
The word “mato oput” can be literally translated as “drinking the bitter 
root.”135  The mato oput ceremony is practised by the Acholi tribe of Uganda. 
It is a day-long session that, just like the gacaca, is aimed at restoring social 
harmony.136  
 
In their tradition and religion, the Acholi society believes firmly that man is a 
sacred being whose blood ought not to be spilled without just cause. Within 
such a community, if one person happens to kill another, the killing provokes 
the anger of the deities and ancestral spirits of the victim. It is believed that 
the angered deities and ancestral spirits may permit or even invite evil spirits 
to invade homesteads and harm the inhabitants of the offending side. 
Moreover, such killings automatically create a supernatural barrier between 
the clan of the killer and the clan of the killed person.  As soon as someone 
is killed, the members of the two clans immediately stop eating and drinking 
together and interacting socially. This supernatural barrier remains in force 
until the killing is atoned for and a religious rite of reconciliation has been 
performed to cleanse the blotch.137 
 
The mato oput ritual becomes relevant for purposes of cleansing the killer 
and reconciling the families of the culprit and the victim. However, before this 
is done the killer has to pay “blood money” to the bereaved family. This 
                                                            
135 Sinclair-Day (2007). 
136 Sinclair-Day (2007). 
137Latigo (2008:103). 
 
 
 
 
41 
 
 
 
money is usually used by the bereaved family to pay for marriage of another 
woman who, in turn, will produce children to replace the dead person—a 
form of reparation.138 
 
The payment of the money is followed by a process of reconciliation where 
both parties eat meat and drink from the same new vessel for the first time. 
In the drinking vessel, the master of ceremony mixes the pounded extract 
from the bitter roots of the oput tree with an alcoholic drink. Other cooked 
food items from both sides are served to the elders, who are allowed to 
mingle freely. From then on, the members of the two clans resume their 
normal social intercourse. In this way, the Acholi people make good the 
damage caused by the spilling of the sacred blood of human beings.139 
 
This paper observes that on the positive side, the mato oput ceremony 
encourages truth and recognition of accountability for the offence by the 
offender and his family. It thus recognises both individual and collective guilt. 
It also encourages the offender’s reintegration back into the community. The 
ceremony also promotes reconciliation, forgiveness and social harmony. 
 
The mato oput is however weak in the sense that there is no meaningful 
reparation paid to the victim’s family. All that is paid is “blood money” which 
can be used to pay for marriage of another woman to produce children to 
replace the deceased. This sort of reparation to say the least is archaic and 
                                                            
138 Latigo (2008:103-105). 
139 Latigo (2008:103-105). 
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cannot be encouraged if the mato oput is to be used as an analogue to our 
modern understanding of punishments and reparations.  
 
The other shortcoming of the mato oput ceremony is that the original values 
of the traditional Acholi society have been diluted by the long war in Northern 
Uganda. Consequently, the Acholi no longer widely practice the ceremony. 
As such younger generations question its value and relevance.140  Further, 
since the mato oput is a specific Acholi tribal ceremony, its value and 
relevance is likely to be questioned by non-Acholi tribes who live alongside 
the Acholi in Northern Uganda. Therefore, it is doubtful whether the mato 
oput would, if implemented for the war crimes in Northern Uganda, enjoy the 
support of the younger generation and the said non-Acholi tribes. 
 
However despite these apparent shortcomings, the philosophy underlying 
the mato oput ceremony is that serious crimes under the Acholi tribe must 
not be left unpunished. This is evidenced by the fact that when a person kills 
another there is a temporary severance of relationship between the 
offender’s family and the bereaved family until a cleansing ceremony is 
performed. This ritual ceremony is performed to condemn the evil act, 
thereby recognising that evil should not be left unattended to before the two 
families can reconcile.141 
 
 
 
                                                            
140 Rose and Sekkandi (2007).  
141 Latigo (2008:108). 
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3.2.3. The Magamba Spirits  
Magamba ceremony is essentially a form restorative justice at the community 
level that developed in the aftermath of the 1976–92 bloody civil war in 
Mozambique. Although the end of the war brought massive relief to the 
victims, from a transitional justice perspective, the Mozambican government 
did not develop any specific policy with regard to the abuses that had been 
perpetrated during the war. The government maintained a culture of silence 
and just encouraged the victims to forgive and forget under the pretext of 
peace building and national reconciliation.142 
 
Through the magamba spiritual ritual, victims of the war have found solace 
as this is the only forum where their plight as victims has been recognised. 
The ritual illustrates a local form of post-war justice in which war survivors 
are called upon to assume their own individual and collective responsibilities 
over some of the events of the war.143 Magamba are generally perceived to 
be spirits of dead victims who return to the realm of the living to fight for 
justice. In their varied meanings and manifestations, magamba both heal 
war-related wounds and play a critical role in the realisation of restorative 
justice among the survivors of war.144 Thus, the magamba ritual is based on 
the viewpoint that spirits of victims of atrocities will not rest until justice is 
done. 
 
                                                            
142Igreja and Dias-Lambranca (2008:61). The fact that the Mozambican transition from civil 
war to peace was enacted through a negotiated process and that both Renamo and Frelimo 
had been involved in the perpetration of serious abuses, may have shaped the choice of 
transitional justice which followed. See Igreja (2009:278). 
143 Igreja (2009:277). 
144 Igreja and Dias-Lambranca (2008:62). 
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In the magamba rituals, the spirits of the dead victims come back to haunt 
the person who killed them or their family members. As such the killer or 
family members may develop disabilities, become impotent, fail to conceive, 
if female, or even die.  When these things happen, the haunted family 
consults magamba healers whose role is to identify the spirit responsible for 
the suffering. Once identified, the healers invite the haunted person and his 
family to a healing process where the relations of the deceased victim are 
also present. For the healing to take place, the haunted person and his 
family are supposed to first acknowledge the wrong deed done and 
undertake to make reparations. The reparations vary and may include 
building a hut on the site where the victim was killed.145 
 
During the magamba ritual, the magamba healers assume the role identical 
to that of a judge or an adjudicator. When the spirit reveals itself, the healers 
indict the perpetrator with the allegations, inquiring from him or her, while at 
the same time exerting pressure on him or her to accept what the spirit has 
said.  The magamba institution has thus embodied a form of institutional 
authority which has power to enforce certain types of truths, a thing which 
State authorities have failed to do.146 It is for this reason that it has benefited 
from official enforcement from State agencies like the police. For instance, 
police have at times issued official notifications to force unwilling relatives of 
sick persons to participate in the rituals. Although not part of government’s 
                                                            
145 Igreja and Dias-Lambranca (2008:72-75). 
146 Igreja (2009:293). 
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policy, this has nevertheless become possible because most police officers 
share the similar beliefs in the magamba institution.147 
 
 The magamba ritual ceremony has achieved several goals of justice. First, 
the offender or the affected family member is healed. Second, truth, 
accountability and reparations for the offence are achieved. Furthermore, the 
process also restores the relationship between the offender’s and the victim’s 
families.148 
 
The philosophy behind the magamba rituals is also identical to the one 
encouraged in the international criminal law discourse. The magamba is 
premised on the fact that crime must not be left unpunished. It is based on 
the traditional philosophy that the killing of a human being is a serious 
offence which “requires immediate redress through atonement rituals. If the 
wrong doing is not acknowledged, the spirit of the innocent victim will return 
to the realm of the living to struggle for justice.”149 
 
Through the study of the above-mentioned traditional justice institutions, this 
paper has managed to show that traditional justice also imposes a duty on 
society in respect of serious crimes under custom. There are certain crimes 
under tradition which must not go unpunished. The most obvious crime of all 
is killing of a human being. In this way, traditional justice and international 
justice are not necessarily inconsistent with each other in terms of the values 
they aim to achieve.  
                                                            
147 Igreja (2009:290). 
148 Igreja and Dias-Lambranca (2008:69-72). 
149 Igreja and Dias-Lambranca (2008:68). 
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3.3.  Common Features of Traditional Justice Mechanisms 
In view of the just-ended discussion, the section that follows analyses 
common features of traditional justice so as to test their ability to deal with 
serious crimes under international law. 
 
3.3.1. Reconciliation 
The above discussion has shown that the effectiveness of African traditional 
justice in achieving reconciliation cannot be doubted. However the question 
is whether reconciliation can be achieved where commission of serious 
international crimes is alleged in traditional courts. 
 
In Burundi, for example, Ubushingantahe—a local dispute resolution 
institution—tried to develop a processes of reconciliation. It succeeded in 
several communities, but failed in the majority of the others. Likewise in 
Rwanda, the gacaca courts as discussed were embedded in the notion of 
reconciliation.150 However, because of the seriousness of the offences dealt 
with, their actual experiences have been inclined to retribution. The process 
may thus be said not to have had relative success in achieving reconciliation. 
Likewise, though the mato oput has succeeded in bringing reconciliation in 
the case of ordinary crimes, it is doubtful whether it can succeed in settling 
war crimes against senior leaders of the LRA. Indeed, much as the affected 
people in Northern Uganda are willing to reconcile with re-integrated child 
                                                            
150 The Preamble to the Organic Law No. 40/2000 states that among other things, the 
purpose of the gacaca institutions was to consider achievements of reconciliation and 
reconstitution of the Rwandese society, though eradication of a culture of impunity was also 
one of the main goals.  
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soldiers, they nevertheless desire that the rebel leaders be punished for their 
criminal deeds.151 
 
This shows that although African traditional justice mechanisms promote 
reconciliation, they cannot guarantee this when it comes to serious 
international crimes. However, even though this is the case, traditional justice 
is better on the aspect of reconciliation than international criminal law which 
focuses on retribution. 
 
3.3.2. Accountability and Truth-Telling 
African traditional justice encourages offenders to tell the truth and to 
appreciate and accept responsibility for their actions. It is generally accepted 
that accountability may result in some discomfort to the offender. However 
traditional justice controls the accountability process in such a way that it is 
not as harsh as to degenerate into further antagonism and animosity, thereby 
further alienating the offender.152  
 
The paper has observed that the practice of mato oput is predicated on full 
acceptance of one’s responsibility for the crime committed. In its practice, 
emancipation is possible, but only through this voluntary admission of 
wrongdoing and the acceptance of responsibility.153 In Mozambique, truth- 
                                                            
151 During a survey taken in 2005, 66 percent of the respondents said that they favoured 
“hard options” in dealing with LRA leaders, including trials, punishment, or imprisonment. 
Only 22 percent preferred “soft options” such as forgiveness, reconciliation, and 
reintegration. This shows that the victims are unwilling to reconcile with the rebel LRA 
leaders. See Otim and Wierda (2010:6). 
152Oko (2004:18).  
153Latigo (2008:103-105). Similar principles apply in reconciliation rites that are performed in 
neighbouring regions of Uganda. 
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seeking through ritual public narratives and acknowledgement of guilt by the 
offender is a crucial element in the gamba spirit scenes.154 The 
bashingantahe in Burundi are not today dealing with the legacy of grave 
human rights violations, but the accountability component is very prominent 
in their customary dispute settlement sessions.155  Finally, though the old 
gacaca had restoration of social harmony as the main goal, today’s gacaca is 
strongly orientated towards retribution, emphasising need for some degree of 
accountability.156  
 
So, the general propensity for reconciliation under traditional justice 
processes, does not affect the need for truth telling and accountability for the 
wrong done by the offender. This is in line with article 25 (2) of the Rome 
Statute, which entails individual criminal responsibility for offences 
committed. It is also in line with the duty to investigate and prosecute serious 
crimes, which entails holding someone accountable for the offences 
committed, and which is generally in line with the whole idea of transitional 
justice, namely the establishment of truth. 
 
It can therefore be argued that even though under African traditional justice a 
wrong is owned by the whole community of the wrong doer, there are 
elements of individual criminal responsibility which gain currency through the 
requirement of holding someone accountable. Thus for once, there is 
similarity here between African traditional justice and international criminal 
justice. 
                                                            
154 Igreja and Dias-Lambranca (2008:69-72). 
155Huyse (2008:12). 
156 Huyse (2008:12). 
 
 
 
 
49 
 
 
 
3.3.3. Restorative Penalties (Reparations) and Retributive Penalties 
Traditional justice requires that reparations be made to the victims of the 
crime. This is because, as seen above, the main purpose of the ceremonial 
procedure is to restore social harmony and to reconcile the parties. 
Reparation is therefore seen as a way of maintaining the status quo of the 
victim. It usually involves payment of compensation.157 
 
In Rwanda, the gacaca legislation provides for two types of reparation.158  
Further, contrary to general belief, traditional justice is not only concerned 
with restorative penalties. It is also concerned with retributive penalties or 
punishment. For example, among the Chewa tribe in Malawi, punishment 
involves payment of chickens or goats to the chief. In extreme cases, 
especially among the old Igbo custom in Nigeria, punishment included the 
death penalty, ostracism, forfeiture of valuable property and caricature on the 
offender’s body.159 The above shows that there is a sense of atonement in 
traditional justice systems in the same way as there is in the international 
criminal justice system. 
 
However, when it comes to reparations in respect of serious international 
crimes, both traditional justice and international criminal justice stand on par 
as failures.  It is doubtful whether reparations imposed by traditional courts 
                                                            
157As seen in our case study, in the mato oput ceremony compensation involves payment of 
blood money, which compensates for the death of the victim, and which is usually used as 
payment for the purposes of marrying another woman to produce children to replace the 
deceased. Further, magamba healers emphasise on repairing the damage inflicted by the 
offender in order   to deal successfully with the legacy of the civil war. 
158Huyse (2008:13). A fund has been set to compensate individuals, their family or their clan. 
It is yet to become operational. The other form of reparation is of a collective nature. It 
prescribes community labour.  
159 Oraegbunam (2010). 
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would suffice in relation to genocide or war crimes victims. A perpetrator like 
Josephy Kony would arguably not be able to provide adequate reparations 
for the atrocities committed by the LRA over a span of 20 years. Under the 
international criminal justice system, the reparations regime is even worse.  
For instance, although under the Rome Statute the Court may order a 
convicted person to make reparations to, or in respect of victims,160it is 
disappointing to note that the Court can do this “only in exceptional 
circumstances.”161  
 
3.3.4. Individual Restoration and Reintegration  
Traditional justice employs restoration and reintegration measures in conflict 
resolution.162 Restoration is aimed at the victim, and as Nsereko163 observes, 
African customary legal processes do not only focus on the offender but also 
on the victim. The goal of justice is to vindicate the victim and protect his or 
her rights. The imposition of punishment if any, on the offender, aims at 
bringing about the healing of the victim rather than to punish the offender. 
That is why, according to Nsereko, the offender is usually made to pay 
compensation to the victim. Compensation, apart from being regarded as 
restitution, also represents a form of apology and atonement by the offender 
to the victim and the community.164  
 
                                                            
160 Article 75 (2). 
161 Article 75 (1). 
162 Restoration is usually targeted at restoring the victim’s rights while reintegration aims at 
bringing the offender back into the community. Nevertheless the terms may be used 
interchangeably. 
163 As quoted by Oko (2004:18). 
164 Oko (2004:18). 
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On the other hand, reintegration targets the offender. As observed in the 
example given above, under African traditional justice the offender is not 
simply condemned and deserted. Attempts are made to reintegrate him into 
the community in order for social harmony to persist. As Oko rightly notes, 
traditional justice makes efforts to disapprove of wrongdoing, rather than the 
wrong-doer.165  
 
Gabriel Setiloane relates the idea of offender reintegration to the spirit of 
ubuntu.  He states that the whole process is about “drawing an adversary... 
into the community rather than leaving him outside where he is likely to 
cause trouble.”166 According to the spirit of ubuntu, a person is a person 
through other people (umuntu ngumuntu ngabantu).167 Thus, it can be 
contended that if there is a strong feature among traditional justice, it is the 
idea of ubuntu, a process that seeks to rise above isolation of an offender 
from the community. 
 
In African traditional justice, reintegration or restoration usually takes the 
form of rituals. As observed, in the mato oput ceremony, restoration is 
symbolised by slaughtering of an animal, usually a goat, and the drinking the 
bitter root.168  Ritual creates an emotionally charged atmosphere that 
                                                            
165 Oko (2008:19). 
166 Quoted in Villa-Vicencio (2009:113). 
167 Villa-Vicencio (2009:114). Though ubuntu is essentially South African, it is essentially 
reflected in almost all African traditions. The root “ntu,” meaning “person” essentially 
describes all African people, especially those south of the Sahara desert, who are generally 
referred to as “Bantus.” 
168 The Nyouo Tong Gweno ritual also in Uganda is signified by crushing a raw egg under 
the foot of the offender or cleansing the offender with a twig from the Opobo tree which is 
traditionally used to make soap. See Villa-Vicencio (2009:137). 
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touches many of the participants, victims and offenders and which arguably 
opens an avenue for reconciliation and lasting peace.169   
 
Unlike traditional justice, international justice does not authoritatively promote 
restoration of victims’ rights or reintegration of offenders.  International 
criminal justice is usually exclusionary. Furthermore, international trials take 
place in places far away from the scene of the crime. Thus, though there is a 
regime for victim representations under the Rome Statute,170 this is of little 
consolation to victims who are not able to follow the live court proceedings. 
In addition, although article 75 (6) of the Rome Statute alludes to the “rights 
of victims under international law,” the Statute does not define these 
rights.171Thus, the regime for the restoration of victims under international 
criminal justice is unsatisfactory. On the other hand, reintegration of 
offenders is not even one of the main goals of the Rome Statute. The whole 
preamble to the Rome Statute does not even talk of reintegration of 
offenders.172 
 
Having gone this far, and considering that the purpose of the Rome Statute 
is to deal with serious international crimes, the question is whether 
perpetrators of war crimes, genocide or crimes against humanity need to be 
reintegrated back into the community. The question is whether it would serve 
                                                            
169 Kelsall (2005:363). 
170 Article 75 (3). 
171 Even though the Statute outlines some rights of the victims in article 68, those rights are 
related to the proceedings, and not to the life of the victims beyond the trial. 
172 This must be contrasted with preamble 2 which recognises atrocities suffered by victims 
of serious crimes. 
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any purpose to reintegrate say, Josephy Kony or Germain Katanga back into 
their respective communities.  
 
According to Albertus,173the purpose of reintegration is to ensure that the 
prisoner becomes a rightful and productive citizen in society.  Serious 
crimes, by their very nature, are not committed by deviants. They are 
committed by ordinary members of society, usually under the supervision of 
intelligent superiors. Thus, assuming Katanga is convicted and incarcerated, 
he would still need to be reintegrated back to his community after serving his 
prison term. The intelligence and expertise he used to run military groups 
would be used productively to benefit the entire country. Thus, international 
justice needs to emulate the traditional justice quality of reintegration. 
 
3.3.5. Community Participation 
Traditional justice involves participation of the whole community in the pursuit 
of justice. In African communities  a dispute between individuals is perceived 
as “not merely... a matter of curiosity regarding the affairs of one’s neighbour, 
but in a very real sense a conflict that belongs to the community itself.”174  
Each member of the community is to some extent linked to each of the 
disputants. As such, he or she will either feel some sense of having being 
wronged or some sense of responsibility for the wrong.175 Thus, the need for 
                                                            
173 Albertus (2010:5).  
174 Holleman (1949:53). 
175 Penal Reform International (2000:22). 
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the whole community to be involved in addressing and seeking solutions for 
disputes becomes relevant.176  
 
In traditional justice a dispute cannot be settled unless the victim and the 
offender agree with the final decision. On the other hand, public opinion of 
the community acts as a moderating force against excessive demands for 
compensation or the refusal to accept a reasonable demand for 
compensation.177 Under the traditional justice system that continues to exist 
in Malawi, for example- 
‘although judgment is delivered by the chief on the advice of the 
elders, everybody has a right to speak in an orderly manner, to 
put questions to witnesses, and to make suggestions to the 
court. The privilege is extended to passers-by who, although they 
might be complete strangers, can lay down their loads and listen 
to the proceedings. The chief and his wise elders will sit for hours 
listening   to what by Western standards might be considered a 
mass of irrelevant details. This is done to settle the disputes 
once and for all so that the society can thereafter continue to 
function   harmoniously.’178 
 
There are many advantages of community participation in the traditional 
justice process. First, the opening of the proceedings to a wider public 
participation serves to extend the ambit of truth seeking, as the whole truth is 
established, rather than only the material truth, as is the case in Western 
criminal court proceedings. Furthermore, community participation results in 
the credibility of the process. When the whole community participates in the 
                                                            
176 Oko (2004:2). 
177Penal Reform International (2000:23). 
178 Chimango (1977:40). 
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decision-making process there is satisfaction on the resolution made during 
the process. More importantly, when disputants are part of the decision-
making process, they are more likely to accept and abide by the resolution.  
Finally, community participation shows that traditional justice is democratic. 
Legitimacy and democracy play an important role in transitions and as 
Ambos rightly suggests, strengthening people’s perception of legitimacy 
should be of concern to transitional justice players.179  
 
Unlike traditional justice, International criminal justice does not emphasise 
participation of the community. In most cases the trials take place in isolated 
court rooms in the Hague, Arusha, or the capital cities of States. The 
proceedings are in English or French and the interpretations do not usually 
capture the intricacies of the mother tongue of the victim or suspect. Thus, 
though States may applaud the legitimacy of international criminal courts, it 
is doubtful whether this legitimacy is echoed in the actual communities where 
the offences took place.  Villa-Vicencio is therefore right when he says that to 
ensure acceptance and sustainable peace, demands by international bodies 
for individual culpability need to adjust to the implications of a broader 
African sense of responsibility.180 
 
Community participation is very important for serious international crimes. By 
their very nature, serious international crimes affect the whole mankind. 
However, in true sense they strike at the lives of the communities in which 
they are committed. It is therefore paradoxical to try serious crimes within a 
                                                            
179 Ambos (2009:176). 
180 Villa-Vicencio (2010). 
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closed courtroom, thousands of kilometres from the scenes of the crimes. 
The Rome Statute provides that the ICC can sit anywhere. It is thus possible 
to exploit this provision and try serious crimes within the communities in 
order to achieve legitimacy.  
 
3.3.6. Lack of Technicalities 
Probably, the most conspicuous characteristic of traditional justice, and one 
that would work against its use for serious international crimes, is its lack of 
technicalities.  While cultural laws exist to address crimes, they generally do 
not extend to extra-ordinary crimes encountered during conflicts.181 Thus, 
cultural laws are flawed as regards definitions of crimes such as genocide, 
crimes against humanity or war crimes. They are also defective in terms of 
outlining the general principles governing matters such as categories of 
liability.182 However, as already discussed, the duty to investigate and 
prosecute serious crimes entails incorporating serious crimes into national 
laws. This can therefore be cured by incorporating the elements of the 
international law crimes into traditional justice practices.  
 
On the other hand, this paper argues that international criminal law is not a 
technical field. States that are serious in using traditional justice for grave 
international crimes should not find it difficult to adapt concepts such as 
dolus eventualis, common purpose and joint criminal enterprise into their 
traditional laws. In Malawi for instance, from 1969, concepts such as mens 
                                                            
181 ‘Accountability, Reconciliation and the Juba Peace Talks: Beyond Impasse’ (2006:4). 
182 For example, rules governing perpetration and participation, superior responsibility and 
defences. See Kleffner (2008:2). 
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rea and dolus eventualis were adapted into the local language and applied in 
the traditional courts, which had jurisdiction over serious crimes such as 
murder, manslaughter and treason.183 
 
3.3.7. Quality of Procedural Safeguards 
The biggest difference between traditional justice and international criminal 
justice lies in the provision of procedural safeguards in respect proceedings. 
These safeguards are aimed at ensuring fair trial. Although traditional justice 
offers some procedural safeguards like the right to a public trial, it is 
generally poor in areas such as the provision of right to legal representation, 
right to remain silent, right to be presumed innocent and the right to call and 
cross-examine witnesses. This is explained in brief below. 
 
3.3.7.1. Right to Legal Representation 
Despite legal representation being recognised in the Constitutions of various 
African States,184accused persons under traditional justice are not entitled to 
legal representation. This is the case even in “formal” customary courts 
which have been granted high jurisdictional powers, such as the gacaca 
courts and the formal customary courts in Botswana.185  
 
 It has been noted that the basis for refusing legal representation in gacaca 
proceedings is that doing so would distort a popular form of justice. On the 
                                                            
183 Brietzke (1974:37-56). 
184 For instance, section 35 (2) (b) of the Republic of South African Constitution, 1996, and 
section 42 (1) (c) of the Republic of Malawi Constitution, 1994. 
185 Section 31, Customary Courts Act of Botswana, 1969 (chapter 04:05).  
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other hand, in Botswana, the Government justified non provision of legal 
representation in customary courts on the basis that most of the presiding 
officers have not had high school education, such that it would be improper 
that lawyers should appear before these lay persons.186 It is worthy 
mentioning that the reasons for refusing legal representation are not 
justifiable and do not make any sense. This is because, as Boko rightly 
argues,187 these very same “lay persons” sit and determine the guilt or 
innocence of thousands of equally illiterate persons, and can sentence 
convicted persons to high custodial Sentences.188 Further, the very same lay 
persons use provisions of the Penal statutes, which are barely written in the 
lay man’s language.  Therefore, to subject accused persons to the mercy of 
lay persons, who apply technical laws, while at the same time to denying 
them a right to professional legal representation is totally inequitable.  
 
Lack of legal representation in traditional courts has never been justifiable 
considering the quality of the justice dispensed by such courts which has 
been highly questionable, and needs constant checking.  In many countries, 
the rate of conviction in customary courts has been and continues to be 
alarmingly high. In Botswana, two-thirds of the prison inmates in the whole 
country have been sent to prison by customary courts.189  In Malawi, 
between 1970 and 1971, the Southern Region Traditional Court tried 25 
cases of murder involving 30 defendants. All of them were found guilty and 
                                                            
186 Boko (2000:459). 
187 Boko (2000:460). 
188 Gacaca courts can sentence offenders up to life imprisonment. See Chapter 4, Organic 
Law No. 40/2000. 
189 Boko (2000:458). 
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convicted.190 When it is considered that all these people are sent to 
incarceration without being legally represented, it is noted that lack of legal 
representation under traditional justice is an issue of serious concern. Thus, 
if traditional justice is to be used in respect of serious international crimes, 
States have to adapt it so as to include the right to legal representation.  
 
3.3.7.2. Right to Remain Silent and to be Presumed Innocent 
Under traditional justice, offenders are not given the right to remain silent. In 
most cases, the offender is obliged to answer any questions put to him or her 
either by the court, the prosecution or the participants in the traditional court 
proceedings.  If the offender refuses or neglects to answer questions, his or 
her refusal can be commented upon by the prosecution and taken into 
account by the court in reaching its decision.191 Thus, before the abolition of 
the formal traditional courts in Malawi, in 1994, a person could be convicted 
merely because he had elected to remain silent. In this instance, 
presumption of innocence did not apply in the traditional courts.192  
 
The above situation continues to dominate many traditional institutions at 
present. Offenders are not given the right to remain silent. They are 
compelled to speak. If they do not do so, they are presumed guilty. For 
instance, during magamba ceremonies, the healers compel family members 
                                                            
190 Brietzke(1974:39). 
191 Wanda (1996:226). This was a common practice in the traditional courts of Malawi before 
their abolition. 
192 Wanda (1996:232). 
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alleged to be responsible for offence revealed by the spirits, to accept it for 
the sake of pacifying the spirit.193 
 
3.3.7.3. Right to Present and Cross-examine Witnesses 
Although traditional justice provides offenders with the right to present and 
cross examine witness, the actual implementation of this right works against 
them. For instance, unlike in Western courts where an offender is able to call 
witnesses first, traditional courts require the offender to give evidence first 
before calling witnesses.194 Thus, under traditional justice, an offender can 
not have the benefit of witnesses testifying on his behalf without himself 
testifying. In the formal traditional courts in Malawi, this position was 
exploited so as to prevent offenders from electing not to testify in the event 
that the witnesses' testimony was not in their favour.195 
 
Further, traditional courts do not usually follow an adversarial procedure 
since there is no legal representation. Presiding officers question witnesses 
at length. Sometimes they even conduct cross-examination where 
defendants are unable or unwilling to do so. However, even if willing to 
conduct cross-examination, it is obvious that many defendants do not know 
how to properly conduct their cases. Often, defendants make statements 
rather than ask questions of the witness. The court usually disallows this and 
the defendants are in turn discouraged and more often than not fall silent.   
                                                            
193 Igreja (2009: 292). In a case study presented by Igreja, Julieta, who was suspected of 
having murdered her husband, was forced to acknowledge the accusation from the 
magamba spirit due to mounting pressure from here relations. During the follow-up session 
Julieta confided in the author that she had not killed her husband. She had nevertheless 
complied for the sake of her family. 
194 Wanda (1996:232). 
195 Wanda (1996:232). 
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Thus, many of the accused persons fail to offer compelling defence so as to 
exonerate themselves other than a simple denial of the allegations.196  
 
In addition and connected to the issue of witnesses, lack of legal 
representation in traditional courts results in poor observance of the rules 
regarding the reception of hearsay and expert evidence. Thus, for instance, 
doctors are usually never present so as to be cross-examined on their 
medical reports. Further, defendants are not able to cross-examine on 
hearsay evidence since they do not know what it is.197  
 
 Worse still, under tradition, spouses are competent and compellable 
witnesses against fellow spouses. In this way, in Malawian formal traditional 
courts a wife could be compelled to testify as a state witness against her 
husband and vice versa.198 This is still the case in informal traditional courts 
up to the present day. 
 
It is thus observed that the rules as regards the right to witnesses under 
traditional justice are not convincing. If traditional justice is to be used in 
respect of serious international crimes, they need to be revised. All in all, the 
biggest adaptation of traditional justice to meet minimum fair trial standards 
is to allow provision of legal representatives and legally trained presiding 
officers or assessors in the operations of traditional courts.  After all, there is 
little sense in making customary law core subject in university curricula, and 
                                                            
196 Brietzke (1974:53). 
197 Brietzke (1974:53). 
198 Wanda (1996:226). 
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encourage students to specialise in it, but still insist that they should not, as 
lawyers, use their knowledge to develop and improve it.199 
 
3.4. Conclusion 
This chapter has pointed out that traditional justice, just as international 
criminal justice imposes a duty on societies not to overlook serious crimes. It 
has observed that both traditional justice and international criminal justice 
have failed to adequately ensure reconciliation and reparation for serious 
crimes. Reconciliation, though a major feature of traditional justice, is only 
practicable for minor crimes under custom.  
 
Further, on the positive side, chapter three has found that both traditional 
justice and international criminal justice emphasise individual criminal liability 
or accountability for the offence committed. This is not withstanding the fact 
that there is an element of community accountability in traditional justice.  
 
In addition, the chapter has found that traditional justice is more inclined than 
international criminal justice when it comes to matters such as restoration of 
victims, reintegration of offenders and community participation. 
 
 Finally, it has been discussed that traditional justice has been perceived to 
lack the formality and technicality to deal with serious international crimes. 
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The chapter has also found out that traditional justice lacks procedural 
safeguards in respect of rights of accused persons. 
 
In brief, chapter three has shown that there is nothing extraordinary about 
international criminal law in dealing with serious crimes. Traditional justice as 
long as adapted, can equally deal with serious crimes under international 
law, as it is also based on the same philosophy that serious crimes must not 
be left unpunished. This will not be inconsistent with the obligations of States 
under international criminal law. The following chapter discusses how States 
can in practice adapt their traditional justice mechanisms so as to be able to 
deal with serious international crimes.  
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Chapter Iv 
Practical Implementation of Traditional Justice in Dealing With Serious 
International Crimes 
4.1. Introduction 
The previous chapters have shown that the use of traditional justice for 
serious international crimes is theoretically possible. This chapter attempts to 
expose the practical implementation of traditional justice in the fight against 
serious international crimes. The chapter will show two practical ways in 
which traditional justice can be used to deal with serious international crimes. 
The first way, referred to as ‘the extremist approach,’ argues for the use of 
traditional or customary courts in trying serious international crimes. The 
second way, referred to as ‘the moderate approach,’ argues for the 
continued use of Western courts in trying serious international crimes, but 
with a touch of traditional justice. 
 
4.2. Using Traditional Courts to try Serious International Crimes 
 (The   Extremist Approach) 
States can employ the typical traditional or customary courts to try serious 
crimes under international law.  There are various steps that have to be 
taken if an international crime is to find its way into the traditional courts. This 
is where there is need for adaptation. In order to try serious crimes, the 
traditional courts, at the minimum, need the following: First, they need to 
have jurisdiction over the international crimes. Second, they need to have the 
necessary procedures to try serious crimes. Finally, they need to have 
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judicial officers who understand international criminal law. The following 
discussion expands on this. 
 
4.2.1. Jurisdiction 
In chapter two, this paper has noted that the essence of the complementarily 
principle of the Rome Statute is to enhance and perfect States’ national legal 
systems in respect of jurisdiction over serious international crimes. It 
therefore follows that a State assumes jurisdiction to try international crimes 
when it incorporates them into its national laws. Thus, once the serious 
international crimes have been so incorporated into the national laws, a State 
can assign the jurisdiction over them to traditional courts.  
 
Rwanda has shown a good example of what incorporation of serious 
international crimes into national laws can achieve.  Although the country 
had been a signatory to the 1948 United Nations Genocide Convention, the 
country’s penal code lacked the means necessary for prosecuting the crime 
of genocide. As a result, in 1996, the country passed the Organic Law on the 
Organisation of Prosecution for Offences Constituting Crimes against 
Humanity since 1990.200   
 
This law outlined four categories under which individuals could be charged 
for their involvement in the genocide,201 the procedures to be followed after 
confession or plea,202 the penalties to be meted out to convicted offenders,203 
                                                            
200 Organic Law No 08/96 of 30 August 1996. 
201 Organic Law No 08/96, Chapter II. 
202 Organic Law No 08/96, Chapter III. 
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and it also established specialised chambers and their jurisdiction within the 
gacaca and military courts, which are courts of first instance in all genocide 
cases.204  
 
In this example, jurisdiction of genocide, an international crime, was 
successfully assigned to gacaca courts which are traditional courts. This 
supports the argument that assignment of jurisdiction over serious 
international crimes to traditional courts is not rocket science. In Malawi, as 
early as the 1970s, traditional courts had jurisdiction over serious crimes like 
murder, manslaughter and treason. It is argued that like the gacaca courts, 
Malawi can assign jurisdiction over international crimes to these courts, 
today, if the need arises. 
 
4.2.2. Procedure 
Once a State assigns jurisdiction over international crimes to traditional 
courts, the next important issue would be to review the procedures to be 
followed in such courts. Procedures to be followed in trying serious 
international crimes in traditional courts must meet minimum international 
standards of fair trial and due process.  This paper has observed that 
customary law procedures are irregular as they do not normally favour the 
rights of accused persons. The paper thus submits that the answer to 
correcting these and other irregular procedures lies in enacting special 
statutes governing procedure in traditional courts. Such procedures should 
                                                                                                                                                                        
203 Organic Law No.08/96, Chapter IV. 
204 Organic Law No. 08/96, Chapter V. See also Articles 33 and 34, Organic Law No. 
40/2000. 
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allow for legal representation in traditional courts, make traditional courts, 
courts of record, adapt local languages for use in trying international crimes 
and allow for conduct of trials in camera, where necessary.  
 
To begin with, the presence of lawyers in traditional courts would help 
presiding officers in the proper implementation of procedural rules during 
trial. These rules may relate to the procedure for handling confessions, for 
calling and examining witnesses and for the handling of offenders who elect 
to remain silent. The presence of lawyers would also compel States to 
elevate the level of presiding officers to those who have sufficient legal 
knowledge to understand the said procedures. Such officers may not 
necessarily be professional judges or magistrates, though these may be 
preferable.  
 
Some customary court jurisdictions have already started relaxing their stance 
on exclusion of legal representation from customary court proceedings. For 
instance, under section 16 of the Namibian Community Courts Act,205 a party 
to the proceedings before a community court may be represented by ‘any 
person’ of his or her choice. The paper argues that the term ‘any person’ 
may include a lawyer, such that Namibian community courts would not 
disallow a lawyer representing an accused person in such courts. 
 
Second, traditional court procedures need to provide for the making of 
traditional courts, courts of record. Typically, traditional courts are not courts 
                                                            
205 Community Courts Act No 10 of 2003. This Act is based on customary law. 
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of record as proceedings are oral. Record-keeping would not only be 
important in ensuring a smooth appellate process. It would also be essential 
in guaranteeing the codification of the rules of customary law. Thus, like 
common law, there would be recorded rules of customary or traditional law, 
which would be resorted to with ease when adjudicating upon serious 
international crimes in traditional courts. In Malawi, before their abolition in 
1994, the formal traditional courts were courts of record. They recorded an 
enormous case law that can still be used today. Currently, in Namibia, the 
community courts, which are based on customary law, are also courts of 
record.206 
 
Third, another procedural aspect that would need to be adapted is the use of 
local language in respect of international crimes. There has been a 
protracted misconception that African languages are technically unable to 
cope with the expressions and principles of international criminal law. This 
misconception has never been dispelled.  
 
However, the truth of the matter is that international criminal law, and law in 
general is not a technical subject like the sciences or economics. Therefore, 
there is nothing in international criminal law that cannot be captured in 
Kiswahili or Kinyarwanda languages for instance. States can use a local 
language when incorporating the international law crimes into the national 
laws and during the subsequent court trials. During the trial of Saddam 
Hussein, the deposed President of Iraq, Arabic was the official language 
                                                            
206 See section 18. 
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used by the Iraq tribunal.  It therefore serves no purpose to stereotype 
African languages as unable to deal with legal concepts. It is high time the 
international community appreciated the ability of African languages in the 
international criminal law discourse.  
 
Finally, traditional courts need to adopt the provision of trials in camera. 
Although traditional courts have been perfect in guaranteeing public trial to 
offenders, thereby ensuring accountability and community participation, they 
have nevertheless been disinclined towards offering trials in camera. This is 
against the background that sometimes, there may be need to hold trials in 
camera so as to protect the interests of minors or other victims.  Procedure 
of traditional courts needs to be adapted to allow holding of trials in camera 
where necessary. The gacaca courts already provide for trials in camera 
where necessary, for purposes of public order or good morals.207 The same 
could be extended to all traditional courts. This would ensure the protection 
of victims’ rights. 
 
4.2.3. Provision of Professional Judicial Officers to Traditional Courts 
Provision of professional judicial officers to traditional courts is essential for 
the capacity of such courts in dealing with serious international crimes. 
Professional judicial officers, unlike lay officers in law, are likely to 
understand international criminal law concepts and the necessary court 
procedure. For a long time, traditional courts have culturally been presided 
over by chiefs, most of whom are laymen. However, the gacaca institutions 
                                                            
207 Section 24, Organic Law No. 40 of 2000. 
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have transformed this trend by providing legal training to its presiding 
officers, the inyangamugayo.   
 
Thus, States can achieve success in using traditional justice for serious 
international crimes by combining traditional leaders and professional judges 
in presiding over traditional court proceedings. The role of the traditional 
leaders would be to maintain the traditional aspect while that of the judges 
would be to maintain the international law aspect. The professional judges 
would also guide the courts on matters of procedure. In most countries, most 
of the judges presiding over cases in Western courts are not strangers to 
traditional justice. Most of them were born and bred in the villages. 
Therefore, complementarity between such judges and traditional leaders can 
be easily achieved, as most of the judges would understand both 
international and traditional law aspects. 
 
Further, the professional judges would also be justified to impose prison 
sentences. This is because with their presence, convictions and sentences 
would most likely be arrived at after due process.   The prison sentences 
imposed in the gacaca courts are imposed by the inyangamugayo, who have 
limited legal knowledge. Thus, a sentence imposed by a professional judge 
is more likely to be a meaningful one.  
 
4.3. The Moderate Approach 
The second way of bringing an interface between traditional justice and 
international crimes is what this paper has referred to as the ‘moderate 
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approach.’ This approach would not involve actual use of traditional courts. 
Rather it would involve continued use of Western courts, but using traditional 
structures. 
 
Under this approach, an international crime can still be tried in the Western-
modelled national or international tribunal, but within the traditional or 
community setting where the offences were committed.  The Rome Statute 
provides a motivation for this proposition. Article 3 (3) of the Statute provides 
that the ICC ‘may sit elsewhere whenever it considers it desirable.’ It is thus 
submitted that the ICC can move its seat from the Hague to the community 
setting where the serious international crimes were committed. This can 
ensure community participation and credibility of the proceedings.  
 
The justification for this approach is that the support for traditional justice 
does not necessarily mean that the trials be tried in the traditional courts. The 
paper has observed in chapter two that traditional justice refers to 
conceptions and practices of justice in a particular society.  Among other 
things, justice in African societies is perceived to be inclusionary rather than 
exclusionary. Traditional justice values would therefore be satisfied if 
communities are able to follow the proceedings and see the perpetrators 
showing remorse for their offences, even though the trials are conducted by 
a Western tribunal. Accordingly, it should be possible for the ICC to stage the 
trial of Germain Katanga and Mathieu Chui for war crimes in the Ituri region 
of the Democratic Republic of Congo where the alleged offences were 
committed. Likewise, it should also be possible for the trial of LRA leaders by 
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the ICC to take place in Northern Uganda, among the Acholi tribe, the most 
affected by the conflict.  
 
This approach is however, not without problems. It may be challenged on 
several grounds.  The first challenge would be the security concerns for the 
ICC judges, court staff, prosecutors, defence counsels, accused persons 
themselves and witnesses. This is because the areas which are under the 
jurisdiction of the ICC are mostly volatile areas where governments have lost 
control. They are also usually areas which are difficult to reach. It is 
submitted that this argument makes sense. However, at the same time, it 
could be argued that there are some areas under the ICC jurisdiction which 
are relatively safe. Kenya is an obvious example. Thus, this approach may 
easily work in countries like Kenya. It may also work where, with the passage 
of time, the once volatile regions of Darfur, Northern Uganda and Ituri have 
become relatively safe.  
 
The second challenge to the moderate approach would be the issue of 
logistics and costs. It may be logistically difficult and costly to move the 
judges, court staff and all concerned parties from the Hague to Northern 
Uganda, for instance.  However, it should also be noted that trying the cases 
at the Hague is equally expensive since it requires the transferring of the 
accused persons and witnesses to the Hague. Therefore, the argument of 
expense might not be very convincing.  
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This paper notes that there may be practical challenges for the ICC to try the 
cases within the communities where the atrocities were committed. However, 
it is not impossible. By enacting article 3 (3) in the Rome Statute, States 
Parties knew or had reason to believe that  the ICC would at one point be 
required to sit elsewhere apart from the Hague.  Thus, where possible, the 
ICC’s sitting within the communities can underline the authenticity of the 
proceedings, thereby bringing an interface between serious international 
crimes and traditional justice.  
 
4.4. Conclusion 
African traditional justice has all the structures necessary for dealing with 
serious crimes under international law. Its practical implementation in this 
regard however requires massive adaptation so as to meet the consequential 
demands of dealing with serious international crimes. Time has come to let 
the African sense of justice manifest itself in the international criminal law 
discourse. There is need to completely abandon views which always treat 
the West as rational, objective and progressive, and Africa as irrational, 
subjective and archaic.208 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                            
208 Frankel and Shenhav (2003:1537). 
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Chapter V 
Conclusion and Recommendations 
5.1. Overview 
The role of traditional justice as an option for dealing with the legacy of the 
past in countries under transitions has increasingly gained recognition over 
recent years.209 Transition is usually followed by the need to deal with past 
atrocities, which usually involve commission of serious crimes under 
international law, such as crimes against humanity, war crimes and 
genocide. Although traditional justice has enjoyed an increased level of 
legitimacy among the communities heavily affected by the atrocities, there 
have been little or no attempts to consider its role in dealing with serious 
crimes under international law. Since traditional justice continues to enjoy an 
increased level of such legitimacy, this paper was aimed at justifying its use 
in dealing with serious crimes under international law, an area which has 
otherwise traditionally been reserved for the formal national or international 
courts. 
 
Under international criminal law, States have a primary obligation to try and 
punish serious international crimes emanating from periods of transitions.  It 
is in this light that the question arose as to whether resort to traditional justice 
would not amount to unwillingness or inability of a State to fulfil its 
international law obligations. The paper has noted that resort to traditional 
                                                            
209 This has been manifested in the increased use of the gacaca in Rwanda, mato oput 
ceremony in Uganda and magamba rituals in Mozambique in dealing with the legacies of the 
past in these countries. 
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justice per se is not inconsistent with the duty of States in respect of serious 
crimes under international law. There are both theoretical and practical 
justifications which validate use of traditional justice in trying serious 
international crimes. This paper has outlined these justifications.  
 
This paper has outlined three major steps that States need to follow in order 
to try serious international crimes successfully under traditional courts. First, 
States have to incorporate serious international crimes into their national 
laws and assign jurisdiction over them to traditional courts. Second, States 
have to adapt traditional justice procedure and practices so as to meet the 
demands of trying international law crimes. The necessary adaptations have 
been proposed in chapter four. Finally, the paper has noted that use of 
traditional justice in trying serious international crimes, can only be 
meaningful if States try the said crimes within the regions affected by the 
atrocities. 
 
5.2. Recommendations 
States can use traditional justice to deal with crimes against humanity, war 
crimes or genocide. However, to do this States have to firstly incorporate 
these crimes into their national laws. This will enable them to meet the 
obligations to investigate and prosecute these crimes. 
 
Second, States need to give increased capacity to their traditional justice 
structures so that they can be called upon to try serious international crimes 
when need arises.  This includes increasing the threshold of statutory 
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offences that can be tried in traditional courts, reviewing the procedure used 
in traditional courts, authoring international criminal law texts in local 
languages and training lawyers and law students in customary laws and 
procedure.  
 
Third, African States and people need to shrug off the attitude of inferiority 
when it comes to international law matters.  The system of international 
criminal justice is based on the Western legal system. Yet as it stands 
presently, all the situations before the ICC are from the African continent, 
which ironically takes pride in its traditional justice. It is wrong to despise 
traditional justice in the international criminal justice discourse, in the same 
way it is wrong to despise African languages as being unable to cope with 
the technicalities of the law.  
 
In the final analysis, this paper asserts that the whole idea of punishing 
perpetrators of serious crimes under international law is to discourage a 
culture of impunity, thereby ensuring respect for the rule of law and security 
of the world. However, this goal will continue making little sense where 
measures taken to ensure its fulfilment do not enjoy credibility in the eyes of 
the people who are sought to be protected from the atrocities. This paper 
maintains that where possible and practicable, perpetrators of serious 
international crimes should be subjected to the traditional justice of the areas 
where they committed the atrocities. 
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